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This study examines the technical efficiency as well as determinants of bank 
profitability of 43 banks in Vietnam in the period of 2004-2013. First, bank technical 
efficiency is estimated under the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method applying 
translog input distance function where environment influence is accommodated by 
one-step procedure using maximum likelihood estimation. Second, three different 
groups of determinants, namely bank-specific (including technical efficiency), 
industry-specific and macroeconomic factors, affecting the Vietnamese banking 
system profitability will be examined by using system GMM. Overall, in terms of 
efficiency, the average technical efficiency level is around 73.8% and the period also 
witnessed a decreasing trend with the gap of efficiency between banks widening 
throughout the period. With respect to bank performance, empirical results provide 
evidence that the profitability of Vietnamese banks is shaped by bank-specific factors 
(including technical efficiency) and macroeconomic control variables. Industry 
structure does not seem to significantly affect profitability. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The Vietnamese banking sector is considered to have one of the highest growth 
rates in Asia in the next few years because of the country’s continued economic 
expansion, the quick rise in household incomes, and relatively low penetration of 
existing banking services. Over the last two decades, the Vietnamese banking 
system has gone through substantial changes by being undertaken a series of 
reforms to strengthen and modernize the sector to move from a centrally-planned 
economy towards a more open and market oriented economy. The reforms started 
with the transformation from a mono-tier to a two-tier banking system, followed by 
banking restructuring programs for domestic banks, financial deregulation, a gradual 
opening to foreign banks and the partial privatization of state-owned commercial 
banks. These reforms have also been motivated by Vietnam’s growing participation 
in international agreements, especially the country’s entry to World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and ongoing efforts to adopt international standards such as the 
Basel capital framework or the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
Currently, the Vietnamese banking system has become more important for the 
country than ever in history, total domestic assets in the system almost tripled 
between 2007 and 2012, growing from about VND 1,400 trillion to approximately 
VND 4,000 trillion. Further, more than two-thirds of domestic enterprises are being 
financed by the system and many major industries primarily rely on bank loans. 
Specifically, 90% of all Vietnamese seafood exporters are being 100% financed by 
banks or 70-90% of the total capitals of real estate enterprises are provided by banks 
(VACOD, 2012).  
The banking sector undoubtedly greatly contributes to the development of the 
Vietnam’s financial market as it promotes increasing inflows of fund for the country. 
The measurement of bank efficiency has gained increasing attention in recent 
financial crises when banks that are more efficient are less likely to fail (Wheelock 
and Wilson, 2000). Unfortunately, academia and authorities in Vietnam have not paid 
enough attention into studies of banking activities to improve bank performance as 
well as efficiency level. Until now, there have been several studies investigating the 
level of efficiency of banks in Vietnam (see Nguyen, 2007b; Vu and Turnell, 2010 
and 2012; Ngo, 2010 and 2012; Nguyen et al., 2010; Nguyen and DeBorger, 2008; 
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and Nahm and Vu, 2013), but most of them focus on periods before the year 2006 
and none of them go beyond 2010. Dinh’s paper (2013) is considered the sole 
research studying the banks’ profitability in Vietnam, but the author only focused on 
accounting ratios and completely ignored the economic efficiency level. As a result, a 
comprehensive picture of bank performance aspects is still in need for bank 
managers, supervisors and regulators in Vietnam to develop the country’s banking 
system. 
This paper investigates the level of technical efficiency as well as the effect of bank-
specific (including technical efficiency), industry-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants on the profitability of the Vietnamese banking system over the period of 
2004-2013 to provide a detailed view of how efficient the banking system is and what 
need to change to improve the performance of the sector. There are two major 
objectives to be completed in this research. First, bank efficiency is estimated under 
the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) method applying translog input distance 
function in which environment influence is accommodated by one-step procedure. 
Second, together with the estimated technical efficiency, three different groups of 
determinants affecting the Vietnamese banking system profitability will be examined 
by using system GMM.  
There are six chapters in this paper. Chapter 2 discusses the existing literature on 
both bank efficiency and bank profitability. Chapter 3 describes the Vietnamese 
banking industry structure and the Vietnam’s economy in the last decade. Chapter 4 
presents data collection and estimation methods for both technical efficiency and 
profitability’s determinants. Chapter 5 shows empirical results and policy suggestions 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Bank efficiency 
The banking industry has received considerable attention from academics, 
practitioners, and regulators due to its important contribution to the stability of 
financial system and the efficient allocation of capital. As the stability of the banking 
system depends on the efficiency of banks, a substantial literature has investigated 
bank efficiency which is measured by a bank’s ability to operate close to its empirical 
best-practice frontier (Schaeck et al. 2009). However, despite a considerable body of 
literature concerning about bank efficiency, there is no consensus on the source of 
the observed variation in efficiency. Berger and Mester (1997) argue that there are 
three reasons for this variation: (i) differences in efficiency concepts, (ii) 
dissimilarities in efficiency measurement techniques, and (iii) divergence in the 
potential correlates of efficiency. Generally, the three main efficiency concepts are 
technical, cost and profit efficiency. The last two types of efficiency are commonly 
termed economic efficiency taking into account price information and better 
correspond to traditional bank performance measures such as ROE or ROA. 
Nevertheless, technical efficiency (TE) has its own advantages, as it can be very 
informative in analysing how well a bank undertakes its operations. Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2003) also state that the main disadvantage of economic efficiency compared 
to TE is that its measurement explicitly relies on bank objectives, but this 
dependence can be inappropriate under certain circumstances in actuality. 
In the banking efficiency literature, there are two separate approaches which can be 
used to estimate efficiency, namely, non-parametric methods, such as data 
envelopment analysis (DEA) developed by Charnes et al. (1978), and parametric 
methods, such as the stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) developed by Aigner et al. 
(1977). The parametric methods involve defining the frontier via a functional form 
such as translog, which is estimated by several econometric techniques. On the 
other hand, the non-parametric methods do not presume any explicit functional form 
for the frontier and construct it from the observed input–output ratios using 
mathematical programming techniques. These two approaches differ in a number of 
ways. Firstly, non-parametric approaches do not need to specify of a distributional 
form for the inefficiency component or a functional form for the cost function, but they 
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do not incorporate statistical noise. On the contrary, parametric approaches 
confound the effects of any misspecification of functional form, but they can 
incorporate statistical noise and be used to conduct conventional test of hypotheses. 
Additionally, non-parametric methods may reveal substantial variations embedded in 
the data, while parametric methods can smooth the variation of productivity changes 
over time with a time trend if panel data are available. Moreover, parametric 
approaches require a large sample size so as to provide reliable estimations, 
whereas non-parametric approaches are relatively less demanding in terms of data 
(Coelli et al., 2005). It is noted that results obtained from parametric techniques are 
more useful than that of non-parametric techniques as they are based on economic 
optimization rather than technical optimization (Berger and Mester, 1997). Finally, 
due to the restrictive assumption about shocks to production and cost, stochastic 
frontiers based on a composed error model, which allow researchers to distinguish 
between inefficiency and other stochastic shocks, are considered superior to non-
parametric frontiers in measuring efficiency. 
There has been a wide range of studies about the inefficiency in banking institutions 
all over the world. For efficiency studies specific to European banks, Maudos et al. 
(2002) found an average cost efficiency level of 83% with a 5% truncation level. 
Staikouras et al. (2008) reported cost inefficiency ranging from 33% to 47% for 
various countries in South Eastern Europe from 1998 to 2003, whereas 
Koutsomanoli-Filippaki et al. (2009) found cost inefficiencies in 11 central and 
Eastern European countries varying from 8.4% for Poland to 38.8% for Lithuania. 
Yildirim and Philippatos (2007) reported cost efficiency of 77% for transition 
economy European banks over the period 1993-2000. For efficiency studies to 
Islamic banks, Hassan (2005) used SFA to obtain an estimate of 74% cost efficiency 
and 84% profit efficiency for Islamic banks in 21 countries from 1993 to 2001. By 
using a translog output distance function, Abdul-Majid et al. (2008) reported that 
potential output was 8.2% and 21.5% higher than the actual output for conventional 
banks and Islamic banks respectively when estimating efficiency of banks in 10 
countries over the period 1996-2002. They also found that conventional and Islamic 
banks operated around 3% and 5% below optimal size. In Asian banking systems, 
Hao et al. (2001) found that faster growing banks making intensive use of core 
deposits in funding assets are more cost efficient. Kwan (2006) reported an 
 
 13 
increasing cost efficiency of commercial banks in Hong Kong. Lim and Randhawa 
(2005) compared efficiency level of Singapore and Hong Kong banks and found that 
Singapore banks are more efficient in mobilizing resources for financial services, 
while Hong Kong banks are more efficient in utilizing funds and financial 
intermediation. 
The efficiency level of banking system in Vietnam has obtained attraction in recent 
years. Nguyen’s study (2007b), which is considered the first paper on Vietnamese 
banking efficiency, reported that the average cost efficiency of 13 commercial banks 
from 2001 to 2003 is about 60.6% by using DEA. He also showed that total factor 
productivity increased by 5.7% in 2003 compared to 2001. It should be noted that 
many researchers found a decreasing trend in the efficiency of Vietnamese bank. 
Using SFA, Vu and Turnell (2010) found that the level of cost efficiency of 56 
commercial banks in Vietnam from 2000 to 2006 is around 87%, but there was a 
reduction in cost efficiency in the studied period. Similarly, Ngo (2012) found a 
decreasing trend in technical efficiency for the whole Vietnamese banking system 
through the period of 1990-2010 as the size of the banking sector increases and 
financial market is more liberate. He also reveals that the Vietnamese banking 
system is running at two-third of its capacity, which has limited contribution to the 
economy. Nguyen and DeBorger (2008) also found a decreasing trend in efficiency 
when studying 15 commercial banks in Vietnam from 2003 to 2006 due to the rapid 
extension of the Vietnamese banking industry, especially in terms of network 
expansion and branching. 
Besides that, there are several notable findings about banking efficiency in Vietnam 
that should be considered. For example, Nguyen et al. (2010) estimates and 
compares efficiency performance of 32 commercial banks in Vietnam during 2001–
2005. They found that there were a small number of efficient banks, and there would 
be room for these banks to improve their production efficiency. Further, larger banks 
do not guarantee higher efficiency scores compared to small banks. They also 
reported that bank size, state ownership and market share have effects on 
Vietnamese bank efficiency. Ngo (2010) reported an imbalance of the banking 
system in Vietnam when more than one-third of the studied sample of 22 commercial 
banks has the advantage of increasing returns to scale, the other one-third face 
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decreasing returns to scale when studying 22 Vietnamese commercial banks in the 
year of 2008. Vu and Turnell (2012) using the translog hyperbolic distance function 
for the sample of commercial banks from 2000 to 2006 found a modest growth of 
1.78% per year in the productivity change due to the growth of technological 
progress and the improvements of technical efficiency. Moreover, FBs experienced 
the highest productivity growth because of modern technology infrastructure, 
followed by JCBs and SOCBs. Recently, Nahm and Vu (2013) using the sample of 
56 commercial banks from 2000 to 2006 pointed out that the average bank operates 
quite far below the frontier of the best-practice bank, mainly due to allocative 
inefficiency rather than technical efficiency. Moreover, they also showed that the 
price efficiency scores of SOCBs were much higher than those of JCBs and FBs, 
suggesting the existence of market power for SOCBs in pricing bank products in 
Vietnam. They further found that SOCBs were more profit efficient than FBs and 
JCBs as they are being guaranteed and supported by the government and having 





Table 1: Summary of studies on banks' efficiency in Vietnam 
Study Sample size 
Studied 
period 









Y1: interest income 
Y2: non-interest income 
The cost efficiency increased by 5.7% in 
2003 compared to 2001. The average cost 
efficiency is about 60.6%. 




2000 – 2006 
X1: personal expenses/number of 
employees 
X2: other non-interest expense/fixed 
assets 
X3: interest expense/total borrowed funds 
Y1: customer loans 
Y2: other earning assets 
Y3: off balance sheet items 
The average cost efficiency is about 87%, 
but there was a decrease in cost efficiency 





1990 – 2010 
X1: value of total deposits 
Y1: value of credits 
Y2: value of GDP 
Y3: value of money supply 
A decreasing trend in efficiency as the size 
of the banking sector increases; financial 
market is more liberate and there is 







2003 – 2006 
X1: labour 
X2: deposit 
X3: operating expenses 
X4: fixed assets 
Y1: loans and advances 
Y2: investments 
A decreasing trend in technical efficiency 
due to the rapid extension of the 
Vietnamese banking industry, especially in 










2001 – 2005 
X1: personal expenses 
X2: net total assets 
X3: deposit 
X4: labour 
Y1: received interest 
Y2: other operating income 
Y3: loans 
There were a small number of efficient 
banks, but there would be room for these 
banks to improve their production efficiency. 
Bank size, state ownership and market 






X2: interest and similar expenses 
X3: other expenses 
Y1: total assets 
Y2: interest and similar income 
Y3: other incomes 
An imbalance of the Vietnamese banking 
system: more than one-third of the sample 
banks having the advantage of increasing 
returns to scale and the other one-third 
having decreasing returns to scale. 




2000 – 2006 
X1: number of full-time employees 
X2: fixed assets 
X3: deposit 
Y1: loans 
Y2: other earning assets 
Y3: off balance sheet items 
A modest growth of 1.78% per year in the 
productivity change due to the growth of 
technological progress and the 
improvements of technical efficiency. 
Moreover, foreign banks are found to have 
the highest productivity growth. 




2000 – 2006 
X1: number of full-time employees 
X2: fixed assets 
X3: deposit 
X4: equity capital 
Y1: loans 
Y2: other earning assets 
Y3: off balance sheet items 
On average, Vietnamese banks operate 
quite far below the frontier of the best-
practice bank mainly due to allocative 
inefficiency rather than technical efficiency. 
There exist SOCBs’ market power in pricing 
bank products and SOCBs were more profit 
efficient than FBs and JCBs due to supports 
from government, nationwide branch 
networks and huge customer base. 
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2.2 Bank profitability 
In the literature, internal and external determinants are considered the two main 
components expressing bank profitability. The internal determinants are often termed 
bank-specific determinants of profitability. The external determinants can be 
decomposed into industry-specific and macroeconomic factors. It is noted that the 
macroeconomic determinants are not related to bank management but reflect the 
economic and legal environment that can affect the operation and performance of 
banks. Most researchers have measured profitability using return on equity (ROE) or 
return on assets (ROA). They focus on profitability analysis of either cross-country or 
individual countries’ banking systems. 
One of the first that examines the determinants of banks profitability is the study of 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) who found a positive association between the return 
on equity and the level of interest rates, bank concentration and the government 
ownership when studying bank profitability across 18 European countries over the 
period 1986-1989. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) examined the internal and 
external determinants of profitability for banks in 80 countries over the period 1988-
1995 and found that a larger bank asset to GDP ratio and a lower market 
concentration ratio lead to lower profits. They also revealed that foreign banks have 
higher profits compared to domestic banks in developing countries, while the 
opposite holds in developed countries. In a more recent study, Abreu and Mendes 
(2001) examined Portugal, Spain, France and Germany and pointed out that equity 
to assets and loan to assets ratios have a positive effect on banks’ profitability. They 
also show that bank’s market share have a positive impact profits measures but not 
on net interest margins, whereas the opposite holds for operating costs. Goddard et 
al. (2004) investigated the determinants of profitability in Denmark, France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK from 1992 to 1998. They found weak evidence for 
any size–profitability relationship and a positive relationship between capital-assets 
ratio and profitability. UK is the only place where a positive relationship between the 
importance of off-balance-sheet business in a bank’s portfolio and profitability is 




In the latter studies, researchers use various bank-specific ratios such as total 
expenses to net income, equity to total assets, loan loss reserves to gross loan or 
loans to deposits. For macroeconomic variables, money supply growth, inflation, 
unemployment rate and real interest rates are often be used and for industry 
variables, concentration or ownership structure can be used. More recent 
accounting-based studies tend to adopt panel techniques, instead of simple ordinary 
least squares (OLS), to analyse bank profitability. Studies in this approach include 
Kwan’s (2003) comparison of the performance of banks in seven Asian countries 
from 1992 to 1999, Kosmidou et al.’s (2007) examination of the profitability of Greek 
banks operating abroad during 1995-2001., and Ben Naceur and Goaied’s (2008) 
study of the profitability of 14 Tunisian banks over the period 1980-2000. 
Athanasoglou et al.’s study (2008) is one of the most comprehensive analyses of 
bank-specific, industry-specific, and macroeconomic determinants of profit 
persistence in Greek banks over the period 1985-2001 by using GMM. They found 
that profitability of Greek banks is shaped by bank-specific factors such as capital, 
labour productivity and operating expenses and macroeconomic control variables 
such as inflation and cyclical output. Generally, empirical studies show that various 
measures of cost have negative relationship with profits. Larger bank size, higher 
market share, higher market concentration, greater GDP growth, lower 
unemployment rate, and higher proportions of equity capital assets often imply 
greater profitability. Higher liquidity, greater loan losses provisions, and more 
reliance on debt are associated with lower bank profits, but opposite results are also 
abundant. 
Until now, Dinh’s paper (2013) is considered the only study investigating the 
determinants of banks’ profitability in Vietnam with the sample of 51 commercial 
banks from 2000 to 2012. He pointed out that profitability’s determinants of foreign 
banks and domestic banks in Vietnam are different. Market share and other incomes 
are found to be positively correlated to profitability of foreign banks in Vietnam, while 
cost, equity and GDP growth rate are important in explaining profitability of domestic 
banks. Further, he also investigated the determinants of accounting efficiency 
proxied by net interest margin of banks in Vietnam. For foreign banks, cost and 
market share are found to have positive effects on net interest margin, whereas 
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equity, loans and loan loss provisions are important in explaining net interest margin 
of domestic banks. 
Although the empirical results vary significantly due to differences in both datasets 
and environments, there are some common literature and arguments behind control 
variables that researchers need to understand when studying bank profitability: 
Size. Size is introduced to account for existing economies or diseconomies of scale 
in the market. Short (1979) argues that size is closely related to the capital adequacy 
of a bank since large banks can often raise less expensive capital, hence more 
profitable. Smirlock (1985) reported a positive and significant relationship between 
size and bank profitability. However, many other researchers suggest that little cost 
saving can be achieved by increasing the size of a banking firm (Berger et al., 1987). 
Besides that, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) also suggest that the extent to 
which various financial and legal factors affect bank profitability is closely related to 
bank size. 
Risk management. Without the doubt, the need for risk management is vital in the 
nature of the banking business. Poor asset quality and low levels of liquidity are the 
two major causes of bank failures. Financial institutions tend to diversify their 
portfolios and raise liquid holdings so as to reduce risk. Risk can be divided into 
credit and liquidity risk. The relationship between risk and return is mixed. High-risk 
loans negatively affect bank profitability due to high accumulation of unpaid loans, 
but the risk-return hypothesis suggests a positive relationship between risk and 
profits due to high rate charged. Molyneux and Thornton (1992) found a negative 
and significant relationship between the level of liquidity and profitability while Bourke 
(1989) reported an opposite result. 
Bank expenses. Expenses are also a very important determinant of profitability as 
they are closely related to the efficient management. There is an extensive literature 
based on the idea that an expenses-related variable should be added in a profit 
function. Their relationship is also mixed. Higher costs traditionally imply lower profit, 
but it can also infer higher volume of activities and thus higher profit. 
Market power and efficient structure hypotheses. The application of the market-
power (MP) and the efficient-structure (ES) hypotheses is a new trend about 
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structural effects on bank profitability (see figure 1). The MP hypothesis consists of 
the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and the relative-market-power 
(RMP) hypothesis. The former states that high concentration leads to market power 
because of collusion, which yields monopoly profits through pricing behaviour. The 
latter suggests that only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated 
products are able to exercise market power and earn non-competitive profits. The 
ES hypothesis suggests that increased managerial (RES) and scale (SES) efficiency 
can lead to higher concentration and hence higher profits. Thus, the finding of a 
positive relationship between concentration and profits may be a spurious result due 
to correlations with efficiency. To solve this issue, Berger (1995) argues that to verify 
the existence of MP hypothesis, researchers also need to show that efficiency does 
not have effects on concentration and market power; and to verify the existence of 
ES hypothesis, one needs to show that efficiency affects concentration and market 
share. However, Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) argue instead 
that the increase in concentration is not the result of managerial efficiency, but rather 
reflects increasing deviations from competitive market structures leading to 
monopolistic profits. Consequently, concentration should be directly related to bank 
profitability without considering the effects of efficiency. 
Figure 1: Structure performance relationship 
  





















Macroeconomic factors. As banks are affected by macroeconomic conditions, 
macroeconomic variables also play an important role in explaining bank profitability. 
The variables normally used are the inflation rate, GDP growth rate, unemployment 
rate, the long-term interest rate, or the growth rate of money supply. For many 
studies, inflation and the level of interest rates are correlated with bank performance, 
and the unemployment rate has a significant negative impact on profitability while the 
effective exchange rate is irrelevant in explaining profitability (Athanasoglou et al., 
2008). 
Overall, Athanasoglou et al. (2005) summarised that the existing literature provides a 
rather comprehensive picture of the effect of bank-specific and industry-specific 
determinants on bank profitability. Nevertheless, the effect of the macroeconomic 
environment is not adequately dealt with as the time dimension of the panels used in 





CHAPTER 3: COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
3.1 Overview of banking system 
In order to understand the Vietnamese banking structure, it is necessary for readers 
to understand its historical development as this explains how the current structure of 
the system shaped up. 
3.1.1 Historical development 
Before 1975 
The history of the Vietnamese banking system begins in the late 18th century and 
the system has experienced considerable changes along the side of the country’s 
history. Before 1954, it was purposely designed to serve the French colonization. In 
1870, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) established the first 
branch in Saigon to finance trading activities. In 1875, the French colonists 
established the Bank of Indochina, which acted as a central bank of Vietnam, Laos 
and Cambodia. In 1904, Standard Chartered Bank set up its branch in Saigon. Bank 
of East Asia and Banque Française Commerciale also went to Vietnam in 1921 and 
1922 respectively. In 1927, the first domestic bank, namely Bank of Vietnam, was 
established by a group of Vietnamese intellectuals and dignitaries. 
Between 1954 and 1975, Vietnam had two fundamentally different banking systems 
because of the North-South division due to the Geneva Act in 1954. The system in 
the South belonging to the Republic of Vietnam was a market-oriented two-tier 
system. In 1972, the banking system in the south consisted of 14 foreign branch 
banks, 17 private commercial banks, 1 state-owned commercial bank and 1 joint-
stock bank with the total of 174 branches for the whole system (Doan, 2001). The 
system in the North belonging to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was patterned 
on the Soviet model, known as monobank, in which the National Bank of Vietnam1 
(NBV) was the only bank. NBV was responsible for supplying credit, receiving 
deposits from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), implementing and enforcing the 
central plans of the North government. In 1960, NBV was renamed the State Bank of 
Vietnam (SBV) which is also the central bank of Vietnam until now. 
                                           
1 The NBV was established on 6 May 1951 under the Order 15/SL signed by president Ho Chi Minh 
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1975 – 1986  
After the reunification in 1976, the banking system in the South was promptly 
nationalized and taken over by the SBV. Following the government’s Ordinance No. 
163/CP in regulating the organization and function of the SBV, a one-tier banking 
system following the Soviet model was established in which the SBV was the sole 
issuing bank of Viet acting as both the central bank and a global commercial bank. 
SBV was responsible for issuing banknotes; taking saving deposits from households 
and mandatory deposits from state sector; financing the state budget; supervising 
state funds; serving state sector; and managing monetary, credit, and payment 
operations. In short, the Vietnamese banking system in this period was a typical 
case of a centrally planned economy and completely accommodative to state owned 
enterprises. The mono-tier Vietnamese banking system in the period 1975-1986 is 
shown in the figure 2 
Figure 2: Vietnamese mono banking system between 1975 and 1986 
 
Source: Tran (2001, p.7) 
The central planning banking system was too weak and mismanaged the economy 
due to top-down unrealistic orders. This led to the hyper-inflation of 774% in 1986 
(Abuza, 2002, p.4), huge budget deficit, depressed production, dire poverty and the 
collapse of people’s credit union (Dinh, 1997). Besides that, the threat of aid 
withdrawal from Soviet Union, the friction with China and the embargo imposed by 
the United States also aggravated the situation. As a result, the Vietnamese 
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government decided to implement an economic revolution in the end of 1986 with 
the aim of reforming and transforming the economy from closed command based on 
central planning to market-oriented type (Siregar, 1999). Due to its importance, the 
banking system was selected as one of the first sectors to be reformed to combat the 
multifaceted economic crisis. 
Banking reformation 
The banking reformation in Vietnam started in 1988 with the aim of expanding and 
diversifying the banking system, rationalizing interest rates, and improving credit 
allocation, legislation, and supervision. The ultimate objective is to create a sound 
banking system capable of mobilizing and allocating financial resources to the best 
uses in order to improve the economic growth. The reform consisted of 
decentralization, liberalisation, legislation and supervision, recapitalization and 
privatization (Le, 2006). 
To decentralize the banking system, the Vietnamese government detached state 
management in money, credit and banking from commercial banking following the 
Decision No. 53/HDBT in 1988. Since then, the SBV has acted as the central bank of 
Vietnam and been responsible for conducting national monetary policy and 
supervising commercial banks. This transformed the monobank system into a two-
tier banking system in which the SBV handed over all commercial banking functions 
to commercial banks and began act as a true central bank (see Figure 3). In 1988, 
the SBV’s commercial banking functions were also commercialized and passed over 
to four newly established state-owned commercial banks consisting of Vietnam Bank 
for Agriculture and Rural Development (often called Agribank), Vietnam Joint-Stock 
Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade (often called Viettinbank), Bank for 
Investment and Development of Vietnam (often called BIDV) and Joint Stock 
Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam (often called Vietcombank). The four 
banks were sector-specialized in the beginning: Agribank primarily offered credit 
services to the agricultural sector and rural areas, Viettinbank was a financier of 
industrial development projects, BIDV served as a development bank that financed 
infrastructure and investment projects and Vietcombank was responsible for 
financing foreign trade transactions and managing foreign currency reserves. 
Currently, they offer a wide range of financial services and no longer specialize in 
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their former focuses. It should be noted that these four banks are always considered 
the biggest banks in the Vietnamese banking system. 
Figure 3: Structure of the two-tier banking system in Vietnam (after May 1990) 
 
Source: Ngo (2012, p.5) 
After decentralization, the Vietnamese banking system was liberalized to reduce the 
domination of the SOCBs in 1989 as this caused irrational allocation of the country’s 
financial resources. For example, 90% of bank credits were distributed to SOEs in 
1991 (Le, 2006). Liberalisation allowed the entry of new banks, thus promoted 
competition and increased allocative efficiency. The restructuring process continued 
with the announcement of two Decrees in 1990: one on the State Bank of Vietnam 
and the other on Banks, Credit and Cooperative and Financial Companies. This 
marked a new step towards the market oriented system. Since then, many JCBs, 
JVBs and FBs were established and started to open their representative offices in 
Vietnam. In fact, the number of JCBs, JVBs, and FBs significantly increased from 0 
in 1990 to 52 in 1995 (see the table 14 in the appendix). 
After liberalisation, the importance of prudent banking legislation and supervision 
attracted the attention of government to reduce the risk of systematic crises, 
especially in the early stage of the economic revolution. Thus, many regulations in 
managing the banking sector were imposed. For example, for loan security, the 
Decision No. 217/QD-NH1 in 1996 allowed borrowers to pledge land-use right 
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institutions to lend to a single client more than 15% of their equity except for loans 
authorized by the government. In 2005, Basel Accord on capital adequacy which 
requires banks to have their equity equal to at least 8% of risk-adjusted assets was 
adopted for the Vietnamese banking system. The rules for deposit insurance were 
also imposed in 1999 following the Decree No. 89/1999/ND-CP that commercial 
banks must purchase deposit insurances from the Deposit Insurance Corporation of 
Vietnam. 
Recapitalization was implemented next to provide banks sufficient capital to absorb 
market shocks and grow. In 1998, VND2.4 trillion was allocated from the SBV into 
SOCBs. In 2001, another state fund was spent for the recapitalization, conditional on 
the fulfilment of bank-specific operational and financial reform targets set up by the 
government (IMF, 1999). In 2003, VND1,900 billion from the national budget was 
allocated by the ministry of finance to SOCBs. In 2004, the SBV injected VND38,102 
billion into the SOCBs through open markets (Saigon Economic Times, 2004). 
The final move in the banking reform is the pending privatization for SOCBs. Until 
now, Viettinbank and Vietcombank among other SOCBs are privatized the most with 
35.54% and 22.9% in 2013 respectively (Viettinbank annual report, 2013 and 
Vietcombank annual report, 2013). Currently, the government plans to equitize more 
SOCBs either through formal auctions or as IPOs; and BIDV is the third SOCB under 
the privatization plan (BIDV annual report, 2013). Agribank is expected to be the last 
SOCB for the privatization plan. 
3.1.2 Current structure of the Vietnamese banking system 
According to the figure 3, there are SOCBs, JCBs, FBs and JVBs under the 
Vietnamese commercial banking system. Their main characteristics and operations 
are as follows:  
 SOCBs. They are 100% owned by the government (Agribank and BIDV) or 
partially equitized but the state is still the largest shareholder (Viettinbank, 
Vietcombank, and MHB). Most of them have advantages of large capital size, 
reflecting in VND 64,037 billion of chartered capital in 2010. State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) which often have higher exposure to non-performing loans 
compared to other enterprises are their traditional customers. Specifically, 60% of 
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2010’s non-performing loans were from SOEs. During the period 2005-2010, 
SOCB’s market share has dramatically reduced, though still remains higher than 
those of JCBs, JVBs and FBs. The total loans of the sector made by four largest 
SOCBs, namely BIDV, Agribank, Vietcombank and Viettinbank reduced from 
74.2% in 2005 to 48.3% in 2010. SOCBs’ deposits market share also declined 
from 74.2% in 2005 to 47.7% in 2010. 
 JCBs. They operate more actively and have gradually grabbed market share from 
SOCBs over time. They also have diversified shareholder composition and focus 
on retail banking and lending to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Their 
market share went up significantly in recent years, reaching 37.1% for credit in 
2010. Nevertheless, the capital size of the group is still small compared to that of 
SOCBs. Largest JCBs, namely Eximbank, ACB, Techcomback, and Sacombank, 
have chartered capital ranging from about VND 9,000 billion to about VND 
10,000 billion. Middle-sized JCBs that have chartered capital of about VND 5,000 
billion include Military Bank, Maritime Bank and South East Asia Bank. Most of 
other JCBs have chartered capital of around VND 2,000-3,000 billion.  
 JVBs and FBs. They have strengthened their penetration into the Vietnamese 
banking market recently. Retail banking, high quality service and the ability to 
provide sophisticated products are their main advantages. Currently, retail 
banking has not been effectively exploited by domestic banks. Large FBs such as 
HSBC, Citibank, ANZ, Standard Chartered and Deutsche Bank have taken major 
steps in expanding their operating network in Vietnam. Citibank and Standard 
Chartered officially launched its retail banking in Hanoi in 2010. HSBC also 
opened more new branches in Danang City and Cantho City in 2013. In addition, 
some FBs have been holding stakes in domestic JCBs. For example, Standard 
Chartered had the holdings of about 12% in ACB in 2011; HSBC owned 20% of 
Techcombank in 2013, ANZ held 10% of the total shares of Sacombank in 2010; 
and Deutsche bank had the holdings of 10% in Habubank in 2010. Market share 
of this group has not witnessed any major changes due to their mobilization 
which is capped in relation to capital funded from mother banks. Deposits and 
credit market share of these banks are about 9% and 14% respectively recent 
years. Even though the limits on fund mobilization have been lifted since 2011, it 
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would be difficult for the group to improve their market share immediately as their 
operating networks are relatively smaller than that of domestic banks. 
Although the Vietnamese banking reformation has to some extent contributed to the 
development of its banking system and economic growth, the system remains 
fragile, undercapitalized, largely exposed to state ownership and intervention, 
improperly managed, regulated and supervised as the reforms were not properly 
sequenced (Le, 2006). He explains that the recapitalization process was not 
implemented in the right time when non-performing loans (NPL) were not resolved 
as a large part of the NPLs are not secured with collateral and prudent regulations 
were dilatorily imposed (e.g. the delay in adopting the Basel I on capital adequacy till 
2005). This led to a quick rise in the establishment and then collapse of a number of 
undercapitalized but over-leveraged credit cooperatives, which dampened public 
confidence. Le (2006) also argues that recapitalization should not have been 
repeated as recurrent recapitalizations created soft budget constraints in which 
SOCBs continue to finance inefficient SOEs as they believe the state will continue to 
provide funds through recurrent recapitalizations. Berglof and Roland (1997) state 
that soft budget constraints of banks lead to soft budget constraints of SOEs, which 
can lead to the situation that banks only finance worst firms. In addition, in spite of 
the liberalization, the domination of SOCBs still remained due to the 
undercapitalization of JCBs and the legislative constraints over FBs and JVBs (IMF, 
1998) (see figure 16 for the market share of banks in Vietnam in the appendix). 
SOCBs are involved in all aspects of banking with national branch networks and 
focus on financing large SOEs even many of them are inefficient and unlikely to 
repay their loans (Vu and Turnell, 2010). Malesky and Taussig (2009) also found that 
in Vietnam SOCBs place greater value on political connections than performance in 
giving loan and that the firms with greater access to bank loans are no more 
profitable than firms without them. Unlike SOCBs, JCBs concentrate on providing 
universal banking services in particular areas, although some maintain networks of 
branches that allow them to operate on a multiregional or national basis. Their 
customers are often small SOEs, newly-established SMEs, and individuals. FBs are 




However, the reform programs still contributed to the Vietnamese banking system in 
improving staff skills, increasing transparency to assess the true size of NPL and 
raising profitability (IMF, 2002). As a result, the banking industry made much 
progress through the merger and acquisition of weak banks among the JCBs, the 
phasing away of government’s intervention in lending from the SOCBs, and the 
decline in NPL achieved largely through loans growth and some write-offs (IMF, 
2003). The autonomy and accountability of the commercial banks have been 
institutionalized and improved in practice, and they have the right to decide on 
deposit and lending interest rates, and select the form of loan security. Vietnamese 
banks are principally corporate lenders, and consumer banking remains 
underdeveloped. However, there are room for the Vietnamese banking system to 
grow when only 17% of the population have bank accounts in 2009 (Moody, 2009). 
The decreasing trend of the currency-to-deposit ratio shows payment through 
banking system is replacing cash payment (see figure 4). Currently, the government 
is trying to speed up banking reforms by announcing the ‘Banking Sector Reform 
Roadmap’ in 2006 with the aim to accelerate the restructuring of commercial banks 
and to gradually equitize SOCBs, increase capital capacity, promote competition in 
the industry, and apply international prudential standards especially the Basel II and 
III. 
Figure 4: Currency to deposit ratio from 1995 to 2012 
 












The 10-year period of 2004-2013 witnessed the enlargement of the Vietnamese 
bank branch networks, the removal of many restrictions on the entry of FBs and the 
integration of Vietnam into the global economy. This is marked by the signing of a 
bilateral trade agreement with the US and becoming a member of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) in late 2006. Moreover, there were many substantial changes in 
banking technology, consisting of the application of banking software to computerize 
transactions, the development and expansion of automatic teller machine (ATM) 
networks, the issuing of debit and credit cards, and the development of internet and 
electronic banking services (Vu and Turnell, 2010).  From 2007 to 2009, asset 
quality has improved when SOCBs cleaned up NPLs and made provisions in line 
with IFRS. In this period, the remarkable boom and burst of the Vietnamese 
securities market from 2004 to 2006, the impacts of the financial crisis in 2008 and 
the European debt crisis in 2012 also have effects on the Vietnamese banking 
system. 
Due to the significant changes in the Vietnamese banking sector over the last 
decade, it is important to investigate the level of efficiency over this period. More 
specifically, it is necessary to find out how the level of efficiency of banks changed 
under the banking reforms, determinants of banks’ profitability and if banks’ 
efficiency affects banks’ profitability, relationship between banks’ size and their 
efficiency, which banks are the most and the least efficient, and whether FBs 
outperform SOCBs and JCBs in Vietnam. It appears that no studies have applied the 
SFA method to investigate the economic efficiency of banks in Vietnam over the 
2004-2013 period. Earlier research on the performance of the Vietnamese banking 
sector used accounting financial ratios such as returns on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE) or the cost to revenue ratio. The studied periods of most studies 
investigating the level of efficiency of banks in Vietnam are before 2006 (Nguyen, 
2007; Nguyen and DeBorger, 2008 or Nguyen et al., 2010). Ngo’s (2010) research is 
one of the few papers studying the level of efficiency after 2006, but he only focused 
the year of 2008. Moreover, there are only two studies applying SFA (Vu and Turnell, 
2010 and Vu and Turnell, 2012), and Ngo’s (2012) is the sole paper investigating the 
whole Vietnamese banking system while most studies took a sample from 13 to 32 
commercial banks. Thus, this paper which covers the period 2004-2013 with 43 
banks could provide a more comprehensive picture of bank performance in Vietnam. 
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3.2 Overview of the Vietnam’s economy during period 2004-2013  
3.3.1 The downturn and instability 
In the last decade, the Vietnam’s economy suffered a high inflation rate and an 
expansion of inefficient investments. The inappropriate management of foreign 
capital and monetary system and structural factors are considered the main reasons 
(Tran, 2013). First, in late 2006, Vietnam joined WTO, which has attracted foreign 
investment and then substantially increased the inflows of foreign capital. Tran 
(2013) argues that due to the lack of an appropriate monetary system, an expansion 
of money supply due to the unprecedented large inflows of foreign capital led to a 
high and volatile inflation rate. Specially, because of the absence of a liquid 
secondary government bond market, SBV had to buy excess supply of foreign 
exchange accumulated in commercial banks and hold it as foreign reserves (Pham 
and Riedel, 2012). The purchase of a large amount foreign capital by the 
Vietnamese local currency, called VND, resulted in an expansion of the money 
supply. This finally led to a surge in inflation rate from 7.76% in 2004 to 23.11% in 
2008.  
Second, in 2009, the government decided to reorganise and group major SOEs into 
conglomerates. It should be noted that these giant SOEs dominate key sectors of the 
Vietnamese economy and have abilities to influence the way how economic policies 
are imposed, which distorted the resource allocation. The government made a huge 
tranche of cheap credit available to these giant SOEs and they in turn used the 
cheap resources to diversify into many industries that they had little or no 
experiences. For instance, the giant oil company PetroVietnam invested in hotels, 
securities, real estate, insurance and even taxis. The monopoly ElectricityVietnam 
went to telecommunications and education. Meanwhile, the giant state-owned 
shipbuilding Vinashin invested in catering, insurance and distilling. The lack of 
experiences when investing in new industries led some giant SOEs into huge bad 
debts (Cordall, 2012). One of the biggest scandals recently is the event that Vinashin 
has declared the debt of VND 639 billion in 2010. This caused Habubank, the lender 
of Vinashin, had to be merged with the Saigon-Hanoi bank. Other state giants are 
not better when PetroVietnam, ElectricityVietnam and mining giant Vinacomin have 
debts of VND 72.3 billion, VND 62.8 billion and VND 19.6 billion. Pincus et al. (2012) 
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stated that SOEs accounted for 45% of new investment in the period of 2006–2010 
but were responsible for only 19% of GDP growth. This caused an expansion and 
inefficiency of investment in Vietnam. 
In 2011, the government announced the Resolution 11, whose aim is to cool down 
the overheated economy, and hence restore macroeconomic stability. The 
government cut public investment and increased interest rates to tighten credit and 
money supply to stabilize the economy. As expected, this Resolution 11 resulted in a 
substantial improvement in several macroeconomic indicators (Tran, 2013). 
However, the tightened policy has disadvantaged private firms, especially small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in accessing capital. At high interest rates, they 
were not able to afford funds for investment. The annual interest rate for lending by 
the SBV to commercial banks rose to 12% and 13% in March and April 2011, and 
the interest rate for lending from commercial banks to enterprises had to be much 
higher. Consequently, 100,000 firms (out of the total number of around 600,000 
firms) had to suspend operations and were unable to pay taxes from 2011 to the 
mid-2012. 
3.3.2 The impacts of the global financial crisis on Vietnam’s economy 
The global financial crisis started in 2008, but it influenced Vietnam’s economy since 
early 2009. Interestingly, Thurlow et al. (2011) pointed out that the 2008 crisis 
improved Vietnam’s terms of trade as it raised welfare and reduced poverty mainly 
by expanding exports in labour-intensive sectors. However, they also revealed that in 
2009 the financial crisis reversed the welfare gains from 2008. Reductions in 
demand for exports, foreign direct investment (FDI), and remittances caused a 
contraction in the Vietnam’s economy. The financial crisis pushed three million 
people below the US$2-a-day poverty line. In fact, the GDP growth rate of 5.39% in 
2009 is second lowest GDP growth rate in the last decade.  
Although Vietnam has witnessed strong domestic consumption growth in recent 
years, Vietnam’s economy has continued to be driven by high external trade and 
increased foreign direct investment (Nguyen et al., 2011). As Vietnam’s economy 
depends on export and FDI, the reduced demand in Vietnamese goods and the 
reduced foreign investment has made the economy suffered since the late 2008. 
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Financial crisis and economic recession in the U.S. and other major trade partners of 
Vietnam such as EU or Japan restrained their export growth rate to a considerable 
extent. The crisis exposed the vulnerability of Vietnam’s export dependent growth on 
the world market. The volume of Vietnamese major export products, especially 
agriculture products such as coffee, rice, pepper, rubber, crude oil and coal 
increased in 2009. However, high inflation rate created pressure on the exchange 
rate, resulting in devaluations of the VND. The VND was dramatically devalued from 
about 16,000VND/USD in 2008 to about 21,000VND/USD in the mid-2011 (see 
figure 5). This led to the decrease in price of export products and hence adversely 
affected the exports. In fact, over the first ten months of 2009, Vietnamese exports 
decreased by 13.8% compared to 2008. IMF (2010) also reported that during this 
period the export growth to the European Union reduced from +60% to -30%.  




In 2009, there was a slowdown in the inflows of foreign direct investment resulted 
from the constraints of disposal capitals and the tightening of the world credit market. 
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capital (tripled the registered FDI capital for 2007). Nevertheless, in the first eight 
months of 2009, Vietnam just managed to attract around $10.4 billion. The slowdown 
of FDI inflows in 2009 and the years to come will have serious consequences for 
Vietnam as the FDI sector plays an important role in Vietnam’s export. 
In order to combat the impacts of the global crisis, the government initially 
announced a fiscal stimulus package valued at $6 billion and later revised to be $8 
billion. By increasing government spending, the objectives of the stimulus package 
are to boost investment and consumption, mitigate the impact of the global financial 
and economic crisis on the Vietnamese economy, maintain the stability and prevent 
a slowdown of economic activities. Noteworthy programmes in the package are a 
reduction of 30% of corporate income tax, an extension of nine months for the 
submission of 2009 tax payables, a temporarily refund of 90% of VAT for exported 
goods with justifiable payment documents, personal income tax exemption for the 
first 6 months of 2009 and 4% interest subsidy for loans of up to 2 years for 
investment in agriculture and other productive activities. Details about the stimulus 
measures are shown in the table 2.  Nguyen et al. (2011) pointed out that the 
stimulus package was a timely push for the Vietnam’s economy, it kept credit flowing 
to the economy and allowed the refinancing of enterprise debts contracted at very 
high interest rates. They also reveal that the interest rate subsidy created 
approximately 600,000 jobs during 2009. 
Table 2: Vietnam’s fiscal stimulus measure 
No. Policy measures Amount 
1 Interest subsidy VND 17,000 billion 
2 State development investment VND 90,800 billion 
3 Tax holiday and exemption VND 28,000 billion 
4 Other spending for social security and 
economic downturn prevention 
VND 9,800 billion 
 Total VND 145,600 billion 
Source: Nguyen et al. (2011) 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The sample for this research is drawn from banks operating in Vietnam between 
2004 and 2013. The banks’ accounting data is sourced mainly from the Bankscope 
Database and corporate data is collected through annual reports. World Bank Data 
is utilised to collect Vietnamese market data, some additional figures consisting of 
Vietnam GDP deflator, GDP growth, broad money growth and unemployment rate in 
2013 are obtained from websites “economywatch” and “trading economics”.  
Data of 61 financial institutions in the 10-year period in Vietnam were collected from 
the Bankscope Database, consisting of 610 observations. All financial companies 
and Vietnam central bank were removed from the sample. Further, to be included 
into the studied sample, banks should meet the following conditions. They must have 
total assets, loans, fixed assets, equity, gross interest and dividend income, interest 
expenses, personal expenses, loan loss provision, total common equity, average 
loans and positive average equity. Hence, this finally yielded an unbalanced panel 
data of 43 banks and the number of observations fell to 207. 
The list of banks in the studied sample is shown in the table 13 in the appendix. The 
studied sample comprises 43 banks operating in Vietnam over the period 2004-
2013. These banks can be divided into three types of ownership. 
I. State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs): they are entirely or partially owned 
by the government or state sector. 
II. Joint stock commercial banks (JCBs): they are jointly owned by both the 
public and private sectors. They are organized as joint-stock companies, 
which have partnerships limited by shares. 
III. Joint venture banks (JVBs) and Foreign banks (FBs): JVBs are 50% owned 
by foreign banks and 50% owned by a state-owned bank. FBs are 100% 





4.1 Bank technical efficiency estimation 
This paper is going to apply stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) which specifies a 
functional form for the cost, profit, or production relationship between inputs, outputs 
and environmental factors. Financial liabilities and physical factors are used as 
inputs into a translog function that is used to produce outputs as measured by 
various financial assets. The idea is to calculate an ideal frontier based upon the cost 
of production and/or input usage of the best practice or lowest cost firms in a sample. 
Using a functional form, such as a translog function, allows extrapolation away from 
actual data points to obtain an estimate of the minimum cost of production for any 
output level, or the minimum input usage for any level of total cost. Although 
stochastic cost function has been widely used in empirical research applying SFA, it 
has drawbacks in measuring relative efficiency in the service sector with multiple 
outputs (Drake and Simper, 2003). As output is the dependent variable, only a single 
output production process can be modelled. This is clearly not appropriate in banking 
which delivers a range of services or outputs. Further, efficiency produced by the 
stochastic cost function will be associated with both allocative efficiency (best 
possible use of given inputs to benefit the society) and technical efficiency (maximal 
output from given inputs). In contrast, the relative efficiency measures derived from 
non-parametric approaches typically relate only to technical efficiency. Hence, the 
relative efficiency measures derived from the stochastic cost function and techniques 
in non-parametric approaches are often not directly comparable. 
The development of stochastic distance function introduced by Shepherd (1970) 
overcomes drawbacks of stochastic cost function. The distance function specification 
has the advantages of permitting the modelling of a multi-input, multi-output 
production process without the need to specify a behavioural objective (e.g., cost 
minimisation or profit maximisation). It also does not require input prices, which 
avoids bias in price. Moreover, as it is a function of outputs and inputs, the stochastic 
distance frontier provides a relative efficiency measure which is directly comparable 
to the measure of technical efficiency produced from non-parametric approaches 
that future research may apply to contrast the results (Drake and Simper, 2003). As 
a result, this paper is going to use distance function to estimate technical efficiency 
of the Vietnamese banking system. 
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Distance functions can be used to estimate the characteristics of multiple-output 
production technologies in cases where there is no price information and/or it is 
inappropriate to assume firms minimise costs or maximise revenues. When firms 
have more control over inputs than outputs, input distance functions tend to be used 
instead of output distance function, and output distance function will be used in the 
opposite case. As banks have more control over their inputs than outputs, this paper 
will use input distance function. Important properties of the distance function are that 
it is non-decreasing, linearly homogeneous and concave in inputs, and non-
increasing and quasi-concave in outputs. The translog form is selected as the 
functional form for the distance function in this research. Thus, the input-oriented 
translog distance function with 3 inputs (x) and 3 outputs (y) for the panel data in this 
paper is:  
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Where dit denotes the input distance, ln are the natural logarithms, β, θ, λ,  ,  ,  , 
and κ are parameters to be estimated, xnit and yrit are the n-th inputs and the r-th 
outputs respectively of the i-th bank at time t. This study adds the time components, t 
and t2, as the longer the panel, the less likely it becomes that technology remains 
constant (Tente, 2011). This makes it desirable to include time among the regressors 
as a proxy for technical change, and doing so causes no unusual problems in 
estimation (Kumbhakar and Knox-Lovell, 2003, p.107). The function (1) is non-
decreasing, linearly homogenous and concave in inputs if  
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By substituting (2) into (1) and re-arranging, a homogeneity-constrained model is 
obtained as follows: 
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The residual term of the model (3) can be decomposed: 
            
Where ui = lndi is a non-negative variable associated with technical efficiency (TE) 
 vit is the statistical noise 
An appropriate predictor for TE is the conditional expectation of          , given the 
random variable    : 
      [             ]  
 
   
                                                      
The TE defined in the model (4) does not take into account the possibility that 
different banks may experience different environmental conditions which may 
subsequently have an influence upon their technical efficiency levels. 
4.1.1 Environmental influence 
It is noted that macroeconomic factors, z variables, have an influence upon TE, thus 
it is necessary to take account of them. Generally, there are two ways to 
accommodate macroeconomic factors: one-step model and two-step models. Early 
empirical papers (see Pitt and Lee, 1981 and Kalirajan, 1989) adopt a two-stage 
estimation approach, where the first stage involves the specification and estimation 
of a stochastic frontier production function and the prediction of the technical 
efficiency scores. The second stage involves the specification of a regression model 
where the technical efficiencies are regressed upon macroeconomic factors. 
However, there is an inconsistency in this two-stage method. The stochastic frontier 
production function is estimated in the first stage under the assumption that the 
inefficiency effects are identically distributed, while in the second stage the predicted 
technical efficiencies are regressed upon a number of factors, hence suggesting the 
inefficiency effects are not identically distributed (Battese and Coelli, 1995). The two-
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step procedures are considered to be biased when z and inputs variables are 
correlated in the first step of the two-step procedure. Wang and Schmidt (2002, 
p.144) argue that even if z and inputs variables are independent, the estimated 
inefficiencies are underdispersed as it ignores the effect of z on inefficiency. This 
causes the estimate of the effect of z on inefficiency in the second step in the two-
step procedure to be biased downward toward zero. They also performed Monte 
Carlo simulation to investigate the performance pf the one-step and two-step 
estimators and found that the one-step estimators are based on a correctly specified 
model and are asymptotically optimal. Kumbhakar and Knox-Lovell (2003, p.264) 
also argue against the two-step model that the estimated efficiencies being 
explained in the second-stage regression in this procedure are biased estimates 
because they are estimated relative to a biased representation of the production 
frontier. Hence, it is not clear that even a "successful" second-stage regression 
contributes anything to the understanding of the determinants of efficiency variation. 
Therefore, this study will apply the one-step procedure by incorporating the z 
variables directly into the frontier production function and estimate the efficiency 
effects in one-step using maximum likelihood estimation. Stata is employed for this 
process. Models of the form have been proposed by Kumbhakar, Ghosh and 
McGuckin (1991) and been applied to panel data by Battese and Coelli (1995). 
Under this approach, inefficiency term (uit) is made an explicit function of a vector of 
environmental characteristics, zit , by specifying that the uit are independently (but 
not identically) distributed as nonnegative truncations of a general normal distribution 
of the form: 
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Where    and    are parameters that need to be estimated. 
The value of unknown parameters in (3) and (5):  ,   ,   ,   ,   
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obtained simultaneously using maximum likelihood estimation. The estimates of 




     
    








    
  
This has advantages during estimation because the value of gamma must lie 
between zero and one. Battese and Coelli (1993) also present an expression for the 
conditional expectation of TE, given     
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Where      denotes the distribution function of the standard normal random variable 
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By replacing the unknown parameters in (6) with the maximum likelihood estimates, 
an operational predictor for the technical efficiency including the influence of 
environmental factors can be obtained. To compute net technical efficiency, 
researchers replace ∑        
 
    into (5) with min[∑        
 
   ] and recalculate the 
technical efficiency predictions. Net efficiency scores are the efficiency levels when 
all firms are assumed to face identical environmental conditions. 
Basing on the manual of frontier introduced by Coelli (1996), gamma (γ) is the 
variance ratio, illustrating the total variation in output from the frontier level of output 
attributed to technical efficiency. The value gamma of must lie between zero and 
one. If gamma is equal to one, the efficiency scores estimated would vary a lot 
across different banks within one year as the efficiency is determined by the 
disturbance errors of the model. If gamma is equal to zero, the efficiency scores 
estimated would be the same for each individual bank within one year. Therefore, a 
good model should have the value of gamma (γ) varies between zero and one but it 
should not be close to the value of either zero or one (Coelli, 1996). 
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4.1.2 Inputs and outputs selection 
Generally, in the literature, there are two different methods that are used to measure 
bank services: production approach and intermediation approach. Under the former 
approach, banks are treated as firms employing capital and labour to produce 
services for both depositors and borrowers. Thus, outputs are measured by the 
number of deposit and loan transactions over time, while total costs are operating 
expenses. The latter approach treats banks as financial intermediaries between 
borrowers and depositors rather than producers of loan and deposit services. In this 
case, output is treated as a stock and measured by value of loans and investments, 
whereas total costs consist of operating costs and interest costs. Following 
Humphrey (1992), Berger (1993) and Esho (2001), this paper adopts the 
intermediation approach. 
However, some authors have augmented outputs by adding off-balance-sheet 
activities. They argue that outputs may be understated if researchers measure solely 
the banks' balance sheets, especially with the fast growth of derivatives and 
securitization (see Jagtiani et al., 1995 and Stiroh, 2000). To address this issue, this 
paper adds non-interest operating income as the third output. The selected x inputs 
and y outputs are shown in the table 3 below: 
Table 3: Variables used to estimate technical efficiency – unit: million VND 
Variable Description Mean 
x1 Total interest expenses 2,950,929 
x2 Personal expenses 424,815.6 
x3 Other operating expenses 411,195.4 
y1 Gross loan 3.06e+07 
y2 Other earning assets 1.60e+07 
y3 Total non-interest operating income 389,347.2 
Notes: 




2. Personal expenses (x2): listed in income statement. It is a part of total non-
interest expenses. 
3. Other operating expenses (x3): listed in income statement. It is also a part of total 
non-interest expenses. 
4. Gross loan (y1): includes loans and reserves for impaired loans. 
5. Other earning assets (y2): represents investments and is listed in balance sheet. 
6. Total non-interest operating income (y3): represents off-balance-sheet activities. It 
includes net gains (losses) on trading and derivatives, net gains (losses) on other 
securities, net gains (losses) on assets at FV through income statement, net 
insurance income, net fees and commissions and other operating income 
All financial variables in the table 3 are already adjusted based on Vietnam GDP 
deflator with the base year of 2004 to reflect their real changes. The purpose is to 
eliminate the inflation effects which can distort the efficiency estimation by 
magnifying or contracting the inputs and outputs from the real values. The summary 
of Vietnam GDP deflators for the studied period from 2003 to 2014 is in the table 4. 
The level of prices of all new, domestically produced, final goods and services in 
Vietnam more than doubled from 2004 to 2013; thus the efficiency estimation will be 
distorted considerably without adjustments for inflation. 
Table 4: The summary of Vietnam GDP Deflators 
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
DGP 
deflator 




4.2 Profitability determinants 
To estimate the effects of TE on banks’ profitability ratio and find out other 
determinants, this paper applies dynamic system-GMM panel model instead of the 
OLS or static panel estimates due to the following reasons. First, both static panel 
estimates and the OLS models omit dynamics, which causes the problem of dynamic 
panel bias (Bond, 2002 and Baum, 2006) and this confounds the study of the 
dynamics of adjustment (Baltagi, 2008). Omitted dynamics also means that studied 
models are misspecified, because they omit the entire history of the right-hand-side 
variables (Greene, 2008; Bond, 2002). Second, in this study’s panel data set, there 
are 43 banks (N) which are analysed over the 10-year period (T). Many authors 
argue that the dynamic panel model is specially created for a situation in which “N” is 
bigger than “T” so as to control for dynamic panel bias (see Bond, 2002; Baum, 
2006; Roodman, 2006; Sarafidis et al., 2006; Roodman, 2007; and Baltagi, 2008). 
Third, there is a need to test if TE is endogenous or exogenous in this research and 
it is easier to deal with the problem of endogeneity in the dynamic panel models than 
in the static and OLS models as they do not allow the use of internally generating 
instruments (Roodman, 2009a). An advantage of dynamic GMM estimation is that all 
variables (including lagged and differenced variables) from the regression that are 
not correlated with the disturbance term can be used as valid instruments (Greene, 
2008). Finally, the static panel estimates and the OLS confound a separate analysis 
of the short and long-run effects of institutions on economic performance, thus the 
ability of dynamic panel model to identify both short-run impacts and long-run 
institutional effects is a another advantage (Baltagi, 2008 and Efendic et al., 2008). 
There reasons explain why the dynamic panel model is considered the most 
appropriate econometric technique for the estimation in this study. 
It should be noted that technical efficiency in this research should be endogenous to 
ROE, which means it is affected by factors inside the studied model specifically 
inside the disturbance term. Technical efficiency reflects the effectiveness of banks 
to produce outputs (i.e. gross loan, other earning assets and non-interest operating 
income in this paper) given a set of inputs (i.e. interest expenses, personal expenses 
and other operating expenses), hence it is not largely due to bad luck. Instead, it is 
more likely there is a high degree of endogeneity because of poor risk management, 
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inefficient screening and monitoring, or making loan decisions without anticipating 
changes in the business cycle. Empirical studies investigating determinants of 
efficiency for banks are abundant. For example, Berger and DeYoung (1997) found 
loan loss provisions are negatively correlated with efficiency, Manlagnit (2010) 
reported a positive relationship between deposits-to-liabilities ratio and efficiency, or 
Cebenoyan et al. (1993) found a relationship between ownership and location and 
efficiency. As the OLS estimator will be consistent only if TE is exogenous, GMM is 
the more appropriate choice in this paper when TE is believed to be endogenous. 
Although the General Method of Moments (GMM) provides consistent estimates 
under the dynamic panel models, there is a need to decide whether to use 
difference-GMM (DGMM) developed by Arrelano and Bond (1991) or system-GMM 
(SGMM) introduced by Arrelano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). 
The former can perform poorly if the autoregressive parameters are too large or the 
ratio of the variance of the panel-level effect to the variance of idiosyncratic error is 
too large. The latter adds an additional assumption, that first differences of 
instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This allows the 
introduction of more instruments, and can dramatically improve efficiency (Roodman, 
2006). SGMM is a preferred choice over DGMM in this paper due to the following 
reasons. First, as the studied model specification includes macroeconomic variables 
(GDP growth and unemployment rate) which are known in economics for the 
presence of random walk statistical generating mechanism, SGMM is considered to 
be more appropriate than DGMM. This is because the SGMM estimate has an 
advantage over DGMM in variables that are “random walk” or close to be random-
walk variables (Bond, 2002; Roodman 2006; Baum, 2006; and Roodman, 2007). 
Blundell and Bond (1998) shows that if a variable is close to a random walk, then 
DGMM performs poorly as past levels convey little information about future changes, 
so untransformed lags are weak instruments for transformed variables. Second, 
Baltagi (2008) argues that by improving precision and reducing the finite sample bias 
by allowing more instruments, the SGMM generally produces more efficient and 
precise estimates compared with DGMM.  
Finally, as the studied panel data is unbalanced, it is better to avoid DGMM 
estimation because it has a weakness of magnifying gaps (Roodman, 2006, p. 19). 
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Therefore, SGMM is better compared to DGMM in this research. To estimate the 
effects of bank-specific (including TE), industry-specific, and macroeconomic factors 
on the profitability of Vietnamese bank, this study uses the following model: 
                                    
Where: 
i : individual bank 
t : year 
Y : the dependent variable 
Yt-1 : the one period lagged of Y 
X, V and Z  : bank-specific factor (including TE), 
industry-specific factor and macroeconomic 
factor variables 
  : coefficients of the lagged Y 
  : the bank specific intercept 
          : vectors of regression coefficients 
ε : the error term 
 
4.2.1 Determinants and variable selection 
Bank profitability determinants can be classified in three major categories which are 
bank-specify, industry-specify and macroeconomics factors.  The chosen variables 
are presented below. 
Profitability measures 
The two main indicators for profitability in banking sector are return on assets (ROA) 
and return on equity (ROE). ROE is considered better as it can reflect both the 
essence of ROA and the equity multiplier2 explaining the funds management 
efficiency (Rose and Hudgins, 2013). Thus, this paper is going to use ROE as a 
measure of Vietnamese bank profitability. This proxy has been used in many 
previous studies (see Tregenna, 2009 and Lipunga, 2014). 
Bank-specific factors  
The cost-to-income ratio (COSI1) measures the operational costs as percentage of 
income. Traditionally, the relationship between costs and profits appears 
                                           
2                  
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straightforward (i.e. higher costs imply lower profits). Nevertheless, higher costs may 
also infer higher volume of activities, which can lead to higher profits. Goddard et al. 
(2009) found a positive relationship between this ratio and banks’ profitability when 
studying eight European Union member countries, while Kosmidou (2008) found a 
negative relationship between them in Greece. 
The ratio of average equity to average assets (EQAS1) is a measure of capital 
adequacy of banks to absorb shocks experienced. It is expected a positive 
relationship between it and ROE. In other words, the higher EQAS1, the lower the 
need to external funding, the lower the risk of going bankrupt, thus the higher ROE. 
The empirical studies observing this positive relationship between them are 
abundant (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007 and García-Herrero et al., 2009). 
The ratio of bank’s loans to customer funding (LODEP) is a measure of liquidity 
management. Holding liquid assets helps banks dealing with problems relating to 
insolvency, but they are usually associated with lower rates of return. Thus, it is 
expected that LODEP is positively correlated with ROE (i.e. the higher LODEP, the 
lower liquidity, the higher profitability). This hypothesis is consistent with Flamini et 
al. (2009) who studied the determinants of commercial bank profitability in Sub-
Saharan Africa. 
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loan (LOSRES) is a measure of bank’s asset 
quality. The higher reserves for impaired loans, the poorer the bank’s asset quality, 
which negatively affects ROE (see Kosmidou, 2008). However, the risk-return 
hypothesis implies a positive relationship between risk and profits (i.e. the poorer the 
bank’s asset quality, the higher rate charged, the higher return for banks) (see 
Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). Thus, LOSRES is expected to have either positive 
or negative impacts on ROE. 
Bank’s size (lnSize) is also an important determinant of its profitability. Large size 
may result in economies of scale that reduces cost so increases profit (see Berger 
and Humphrey, 1997 and Altunbas et al., 2001). However, there may be 
diseconomies of scale for larger banks with inefficient management leading to lower 
profit (see Vander Vennet 1998 and Pallage 1991). 
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The number of employees (EMP) is a measure of labour productivity. Athanasoglou 
et al. (2005) show that labour productivity has a positive and significant effect on 
bank profitability. Banks can target high levels of labour productivity growth via 
various strategies including keeping the labour force steady, ensuring higher quality 
of newly hired labour or reducing the total number of employees. Thus, a negative 
relationship between the number of employees and banks’ profitability is expected in 
this paper.  
Technical efficiency (TE) is the level of efficiency of a bank determined by comparing 
its actual costs to the best practice minimum costs to produce the same output under 
the same conditions (Berger and Mester, 1997). Basing on ES hypothesis, technical 
efficiency is expected to have a positive relationship with ROE. In fact, many studies 
found a positive relationship between technical efficiency and banks’ profitability (see 
Maudos, 1998 and Timme and Yang, 1991). 
Industry-specific factors 
Concentration ratio (CR5) is calculated as the total assets held by the five largest 
banks divided by total assets. Based on the SCP hypothesis (Berger, 1995), banks 
in highly concentrated markets tend to collude and thus earn monopoly profit (see 
Short 1979, Molyneux et al. 1996 and Gilbert, 1984). However, Boone and Weigand 
(2000) argue that a higher bank concentration might be the result of a tougher 
competition in the banking industry, which would suggest a negative relationship 
between performance and market concentration. Therefore, the relationship between 
CR5 and ROE can be either positive or negative. It should be noted that as 
increased efficiency can lead to higher concentration and hence higher profits, the 
finding of a positive relationship between concentration and profits may be a 
spurious result. Berger (1995) argues that to verify the existence of the SCP 
hypothesis, this paper also needs to show that efficiency does not have effects on 
concentration and market power if the result indicates that CR5 is positively 
correlated with ROE.  
Macroeconomic factors 
GDP growth (GDPGR) is calculated as the annual change of the GDP. It is expected 
to have positive impacts on supply and demand for loans and deposits, thus a 
positive relation is expected between ROE and this variable. Bikker (2001) and 
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Athanasoglou et al. (2008) found a positive relationship between GDP growth and 
banks’ profitability. 
Unemployment rate (UNE) is also an important variable to control the effects of 
macroeconomic factors. In a good economic environment, banks are more capable 
of charging higher prices in the loan markets and earn higher profits. Hence, a 
negative relationship between unemployment rate and banks’ profitability is expected 




Table 5: Summary of variables selection and hypotheses 
 
Variables Explanation Calculation 
Hypothesized 
sign with ROE 
 ROE Return on equity 
          





















COSI1 Cost-to-income ratio 
              





The ratio of average equity to 
average assets 
              
              
 Positive 
LODEP 
The ratio of bank’s loans to 
customer funding 
     
                            
 Positive 
LOSRES 
The ratio of loan loss reserves 
to gross loan 
                            




lnSize Natural log of total assets ln(total assets) Positive 
TE Technical efficiency 
From the translog input distance 
function 
Positive 
























CR5 The concentration ratio 
                                 


























The gross domestic product 
growth 
The annual change of the GDP Positive 




4.2.2 Validity of SGMM results 
The use of SGMM requires a number of conditions for the results to be reliable: 
The Angrist-Pischke (AP) F statistics is the test of weak identification of individual 
endogenous regressors. It is constructed by "partialling-out" linear projections of the 
remaining endogenous regressors. "Weak identification" occurs when the excluded 
instruments are weakly correlated with the endogenous regressors. When 
instruments are weak, estimators will perform poorly, and different estimators are 
more robust to weak instruments than others (Stock and Yogo, 2005). The test is an 
F version of the Cragg-Donald Wald statistic and is automatically reported by the 
code “ivreg2” in Stata. The null hypothesis in this test is endogenous regressor is 
weekly identified; hence the AP test will fail to reject if a particular endogenous 
regressor is weekly identified. Critical values for the AP F test of weak identification 
are not available, but the Stock-Yogo (2005) critical values for the Cragg-Donald F 
statistic (when number of endogenous regressors = 1) can be used to compare with 
the test statistic. Besides the results of the AP test, selected instruments should be 
significantly correlated with the endogenous regressor (i.e. TE). 
The second test is the underidentification test which is also automatically reported by 
the code “ivreg2” in Stata. It is an LM test of whether the equation is identified or not. 
The test is the test of the rank of a matrix and the null hypothesis is that the equation 
is underidentified. If L1 is the number of excluded instruments and K1 is the number 
endogenous regressors, the statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of 
freedom = (L1-K1+1).  A rejection of the null indicates that the matrix is full column 
rank, which means the model is identified. 
The next test is the test of joint significance of endogenous regressors. The 
Anderson-Rubin (1949) test and the Stock-Wright (2000) S statistic can be 
implemented for this purpose. They are robust to the presence of week instruments. 
The null hypothesis for both tests is that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the structural equation are jointly equal to zero. Under “ivreg2”, the 
Anderson-Rubin statistic is a Wald test and the Stock-Wright S statistic is a GMM-
distance test. Both test statistics distributed as chi-squared with L1 degrees of 
freedom where L1 is the number of excluded instruments. For further discussion 
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about these two tests, see Dufour (2003), Chernozhukov and Hansen (2005) and 
Kleibergen (2007) 
The test of endogeneity is the fourth test. The null hypothesis is that the specified 
endogenous regressors (TE in this research) can actually be treated as exogenous, 
the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of regressors tested. The test can be implemented using the “endog” option 
under the “ivreg2”. If TE is exogenous, OLS will be the more appropriate choice in 
this paper. If TE is endogenous, the SGMM will be the preferred one. 
The test for autocorrelation in the disturbance term is the next test. The SGMM 
approach assumes linearity and that the error terms are not autocorrelated, or in 
other words that the applied instruments in the model are exogenous. As a result, 
the test for the presence of first-order and second-order autocorrelation in the error 
term is particularly important (Efendic et al., 2008, p. 12). According to Arrelano and 
Bond (1991), the GMM estimator requires that there is first-order serial correlation 
but that there is no second-order serial correlation in the error terms. As their null 
hypotheses are that there is no first-order and second-order serial correlation 
respectively, one needs to reject the null hypothesis in the former test but not to 
reject it in the latter test to obtain appropriate diagnostics. 
Finally, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions needs to be implemented. The 
null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments and uncorrelated with 
the error term, and that the excluded instruments are excluded from the model 
correctly. The test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of 
overidentifying restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments, 
but “do not reject” may cast the risk of generating results that are invalid and appear 
valid due to too many instruments (Roodman, 2009b). Roodman (2009b) argues that 
there are no clear rules concerning how many instruments is “too many”, but there 
are some rules of thumb and telltale signs which can be used. The number of 
instruments should not exceed the number of observations. Besides that, the p-value 
under the Hansen test should have a higher value than the conventional 0.05 or 0.10 
levels, at least 0.25 (Roodman, 2007, p.10).  
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CHAPTER 5: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 Efficiency analysis 
According to the table 6, the average efficiency of Vietnamese banking system from 
2004 to 2013 is 0.738, which suggests that a typical bank wastes around 26.2% of 
its costs relative to the best-practice banks. In other words, on average, a bank 
needs to reduce 26.2% of its inputs so as to be as efficient as the best practice bank. 
Most banks have the average efficiency scores ranging from 0.72 to 0.75 (see figure 
6). The highest average technical efficiency over the period was 0.947 belonging to 
Mekong Development Joint Stock Commercial Bank in 2012, and the lowest one 
was 0.338 belonging to Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank in 2007. It should be 
noted that 2007 also witnessed the lowest average efficiency of 0.569 for the 
Vietnamese banking system in the last decade due to the “bubble and trouble” in the 
Vietnamese security and real estate markets. Further, the low efficiency scores of 
0.587 in 2009 and 0.626 in 2012 also shows that the global financial crisis and the 
European debt crisis started in 2008 and 2012 respectively had negative impacts on 
the efficiency level of banks in Vietnam. 
Figure 6:  Density plot for the average scores of banks in Vietnam from 2004 to 
2013. 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
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Table 6: Estimated average technical efficiency scores for Vietnamese banks from 
2004 to 2013 
 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Max 0.947 0.934 0.932 0.738 0.914 0.763 0.717 0.926 0.947 0.791 0.861 
Mean 0.913 0.895 0.834 0.569 0.842 0.587 0.589 0.815 0.709 0.626 0.738 
Min 0.869 0.838 0.605 0.338 0.757 0.473 0.406 0.537 0.555 0.498 0.588 
The gamma is 0.6598 which is not close to either zero or one, thus the findings of 
Vietnamese banks’ technical efficiency in this paper are reliable 
Figure 7: Technical efficiency of the Vietnamese banking system from 2004 to 2013 
 
 
The estimated banks’ efficiency reflects the true situation in Vietnam during the last 
decade. Overall, the technical efficiency of Vietnamese banks experienced a 
downward trend, with the gap of efficiency between the most efficient banks and the 
least efficient banks widening. This is in line with many studies investigating the level 
of efficiency of banks in Vietnam (see Vu and Turnell, 2010; Ngo, 2012 and Nguyen 
and DeBorger, 2008). There was a slight decrease in the average efficiency from 
0.913 in 2004 to 0.834 in 2006 due to the poor sequencing banking reforms as 



















Specifically, the recapitalization process was implemented too early when the 
Vietnamese banking system was quantitatively and qualitatively inadequate resulting 
in a quick rise in the establishment and then collapse of many undercapitalized but 
over-leveraged financial institutions. Further, soft budget constraints caused by 
recurrent recapitalizations also encouraged banks to make inefficient loans to many 
inefficient SOEs, the situation got worse when banks in Vietnam place greater value 
on political connections by giving loans to SOEs even they are not profitable 
(Malesky and Taussig, 2009). 
The dramatic reduction in efficiency to the bottom of 0.569 in 2007 can be explained 
by the “bubble and trouble” of the Vietnamese security and real estate in 2006. 
Nguyen (2007) argues that the unbelievable rise in the Vietnamese index stock 
market by 145% in 2006 was due to the herding behaviour of Vietnamese investors 
and the entry of Vietnam in WTO. He reveals that the true value of securities in 2006 
could be only a half of the market price. Consequently, in 2007, when the 
Vietnamese stock market index, called VNIndex, considerably dropped from the 
peak of 1200 points in March to 887 points in August, overpriced assets as collateral 
for bank loans and overpriced stock price had negative impacts on the banking 
systems when investors cannot pay back their loans and overpriced collateral cannot 
cover the debts. Ngo (2012) also showed that the level of efficiency reached the 
bottom of 0.494 when investigating the performance in the Vietnamese banking 
system from 1990 to 2010. 
In 2008, the increase in efficiency is probably the result of loose monetary policy of 
the SBV in order to encourage economic growth. Before the announcement of the 
Decision No. 16/2008/QD of the SBV in regulating interest rate, commercial banks' 
lending interest rate was rather high (about 19% in March 2008). Since then, 
commercial banks' lending interest rate was controlled within a cap of 18% in May 
2008. Later on, the SBV lowered the base interest rate, thus lending rate offered by 
financial institutions continued to decrease. Finally, lending rate reduced to 10.8%-
11.5%, 12%-12.75% and 8.5%-10% per annum for short-term, medium and long-
term loans, respectively (SBV annual report, 2008, p.30). Besides lowering lending 
interest rate, many commercial banks also increased their deposit interest rates to 
17.5-18.5% per annum to prevent deposit mobilization slowdown. SBV reported that 
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some JCBs even mobilized at 19% per annum along with various promotions (SBV 
annual report, 2008, p.27). As a result, this increased banking activities as well as 
narrowed interest rate spreads, which forced banks to become more efficient in 
attracting deposits and giving loans. Furthermore, the increase in efficiency in 2008 
can be due to the entry of FBs. The year 2008 is the first time ever 100% foreign-
owned banks (i.e. HSBC, Standard Chartered and ANZ) are licensed to operate in 
Vietnam. Many studies found that foreign bank entry improves the efficiency of 
domestic banks by narrowing interest rate spreads and reducing operating expenses 
(see Claessens et al., 2001, McFadden, 1994, or Unite and Sullivan, 2002). Ngo 
(2010) also reported a high average of efficiency scores of banks in Vietnam in 2008 
and concluded that they are relatively efficient compared to each other. 
The reduction in efficiency scores in 2009 can be primarily attributed to the instability 
of the Vietnam’s economy caused by the global financial crisis. The global financial 
crisis started in 2008, but it hit Vietnam’s economy since early 2009. Although 
Vietnam belonged to the minority group reporting rises in 2009, the GDP growth rate 
of 5.39% in 2009 is one of the lowest growth rates for the country in the last 20 
years. Vietnam’s economy is dependent on export and FDI. The devaluation of VND 
by 12.5% compared to the US$ (the major trade partner of Vietnam) in 2009 had 
negatively impacts on Vietnam’s exports. Further, the influx of FDI into Vietnam in 
2009 was only $10.4 billion compared to $64 billion in 2008 due to the tightening of 
the credit market in Japan. These led to serious consequences for the Vietnam’s 
economy. Thurlow et al. (2011) reported that the financial crisis pushed a million 
workers into unemployment and three million people below the $2-a-day poverty line.  
However, a timely $8 billion fiscal stimulus package imposed by the government in 
2009 has played an important role in recovering the Vietnam’s economy. Under the 
package, the interest subsidy implemented in 2009 in which the government helped 
offset 4% off interest rates on loans which enterprises obtain from commercial banks 
was well received and highly appreciated by many scholars and practitioners in 
increasing the banking sector’s capitalization and improving competitiveness (see 
Nguyen et al., 2011 and Moody, 2009). As a result, a slight recovery in efficiency 
was witnessed from 2009 to 2010. 
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The considerable rise in the average banking efficiency to 0.815 in 2011 can be due 
to the adoption of the Restructuring Financial Institutions 2011-2015 program under 
the Decision No. 254/QD-TTg. This put strong emphasis on Vietnam striving to have 
one or two banks of regional stature by 2015. SOCBs played a leading role in 
restructuring the banking system with large scale, safe and efficient operation, 
advanced management capability, and enhanced competitiveness. Bad debts of 
SOCBs were controlled at about 3% of total loans pursuant to the Vietnam 
Accounting System and three out of the four major SOCBs. Further, the government 
also promoted the equitisation for the biggest SOCB, namely Agribank. Under the 
programme, JCBs were assessed with regard to their financial conditions, operation, 
management, quality of their assets, liabilities, and safety levels to be classified into 
three groups: healthy, temporary short of liquidity, and weak. The purpose is to 
create favourable conditions for healthy banks to further develop and extend 
refinancing credits for banks in lack of liquidity, while weak banks were encouraged 
and forced to restructure through merge and acquisition or the SBV will buy back 
their shares. For example, the three weak banks, SCB, TinNghiaBank and 
FicomBank, were merged to form Saigon Commercial Bank in the end of 2011. 
Additionally, weak JCBs will be closely and comprehensively supervised by the SBV 
in terms of management, governance, financial conditions and operation. For FBs, 
they were encouraged to have holdings in domestic banks to compete equally as 
well as to conduct business cooperation with domestic credit organisations. Limit on 
fund mobilization for FBs was also lifted since the beginning of 2011. Close links 
between domestic and FBs helped develop products, improve governance and 
modernise technology. 
 
The year 2012 witnessed many difficulties for the Vietnamese banking system. In 
February 2012, the “loan growth restriction” programme under the Decision 01/2012 
CT in which banks were divided into four different groups with four different loan 
growth limits, 17%, 15%, 8% and 0% led to the situation where many enterprises 
could not access to bank loans while many banks with excess fund were not allowed 
to make loans due to the restriction (Minh, 2012). Consequently, 2012 witnessed the 
lowest loan growth of 5% since 2001 (see figure 8). In June 2012, the SBV reported 
that bad debts surged to 8.6% (202 trillion VND) for the whole banking system. This 
was first time ever that the SBV officially discloses bad debts of commercial banks 
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and the SBV also criticised commercial banks for the concealment of bad debts (see 
figure 9). Nguyen Van Giau, the governor of the SBV, also revealed that about 20 
banks had NPLs of above 22% and 2 banks had NPL of above 50%. He also 
explained that loans given to many inefficient enterprises together with the improper 
supervision from the SBV were the main reason leading to high bad debts (Le, 
2013). One of the main reasons leading to inefficient enterprises can be due to the 
effects of the European debt crisis in 2012 accounting for about one fifth of the total 
exports of Vietnam. In August 2012, the arrest of the banking tycoon Nguyen Duc 
Kien, co-founder of Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank (ACB), one of the biggest 
JCBs, dampened public confidence in the banking system. He and his accomplices 
caused losses of $67 million through illegal cross-bank deposits and investments. He 
was also found guilty of fraud, tax evasion and “deliberate wrongdoing causing 
serious consequences”. As a result, the average efficiency score reduced to 70.9% 
in 2012 after an increase in 2011. 
 
Figure 8: Loan growth the Vietnamese banking system from 2001 to 2012 
 


























Figure 9: Bad debts-to-total loans ratio of the Vietnamese banking system from 2008 
to 2012 
 
Source: cafef (2012) and Le (2013) 
In 2013, in order to deal with bad debts, the government established the Vietnam 
asset management company (VAMC) under the Decree 53/2013/ND-CP to buy bad 
debts from banks by issuing special bonds authorized by the SBV. In October 2013, 
VAMC bought back about 39 trillion VND, thus the bad debts-to-total loans ratio for 
the banking system reduced to about 4.5% on average in 2013 (see figure 10). 
However, Trinh (2013) argues that reported numbers from VAMC cannot explain 
anything and bad debt problem of the system still remains unsolved as it depends on 
many macroeconomic factors and the ability of borrowers to repay the loans not just 
the purchase of VAMC. He also argues that bad debts should be resolved 
collectively not individually like what individual banks are doing currently as it can 
reduce the transparency of the system. In addition, so as to increase loan growth in 
2013, the SBV reduced the lending interest rate by 3% for short-term loans and 1% 
for long-term loans. On average, the lending interest rate reduced by 2-5% 
compared to the year 2012 to about 8-9% per annum, some enterprises can even 
borrow at 7% per annum (cafef, 2013). Nevertheless, Trinh (2013) argues that the 
reduction in lending interest rate could not increase the loan growth as expected 
because the demand on bank loans of enterprises was rather low due to the 
slowdown in economy. For example, the profit of rubber-producing and minerals-
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exploiting enterprises reduced by over 30% and 60% respectively in the third quarter 
of 2013. As a result, the average efficiency score continued to reduce to 62.6% in 
2013 in spite of the efforts of SBV in solving bad debts and boosting the loan growth.     
Figure 10: Bad debts-to-total loans ratio of the Vietnamese banking system in 2013 
 
Source: Trinh (2013) 
5.1.1 Ranking 
The efficiency scores are only relative to best firms in the sample. They only reflect 
the dispersion of efficiencies within the studied sample and say nothing about the 
efficiency of one sample relative to the other (Coelli et al., 2005, p.314), thus 
efficiency ranks can provide a better picture of the studied sample as it can tell 
readers how an individual bank is more efficient than other banks in the sample. 
Berger et al. (2005) also argues that the use of efficiency ranks is preferred over the 
efficiency scores as the ranks are more comparable across time. 
The ranks are then converted to a uniform scale over [0,1] using the formula: (order-
1)/(n-1) where order: the average ranking of efficiency, n: the number of banks. The 
bank with the lowest cost efficiency level has the worst rank of 0 and the bank with 
the highest cost efficiency level has the best rank of 1. There is a fixed distribution of 
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may be very different, depending on conditions in the time period. The efficiency 
scores are converted into the efficiency ranks as following table. 
Table 7: Rankings of efficiency throughout the period of 2004-2013 










FB ANZ Bank (Vietnam) Limited 0.9161403 1 33,964,300 24 
JCB Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.90331185 0.98 7,763,229 39 
JCB 
Southern Bank-Phuong Nam Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank 
0.8372738 0.95 75,269,552 14 
JCB 
Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint-Stock 
Bank – Techcombank 
0.78763886 0.93 132,186,261 5 
SOCB Housing Bank of Mekong Delta – MHB 0.7695871 0.90 38,533,519 23 
JCB Orient Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.76648783 0.88 13,340,489 33 
JCB Vietnam Maritime Commercial Stock Bank 0.76542582 0.86 102,126,260 11 
JCB Asia Commercial Joint-stock Bank – ACB 0.75589884 0.83 127,194,700 6 
JCB 
VietNam International Commercial Joint Stock Bank – 
VIB 
0.75026755 0.81 83,168,625 13 
JCB Vietnam Asia Commercial Joint-Stock Bank 0.74867414 0.79 9,711,826 37 
JCB 
Saigon Thuong Tin Commercial Joint-Stock Bank – 
Sacombank 
0.7477845 0.76 108,644,813 9 
JCB 
Vietnam Prosperity Joint Stock Commercial Bank – VP 
Bank 
0.74699227 0.74 61,555,786 17 
SOCB 
Vietnam Joint-Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and 
Trade – Viettinbank 
0.74636638 0.71 302,286,078 2 
SOCB 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development – 
Agribank  
0.74593909 0.69 447,743,014 1 
FB Hong Leong Bank Vietnam Limited 0.7428483 0.67 4,088,977 43 
SOCB 
Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam – 
BIDV 
0.74187394 0.64 293,799,910 3 
JCB Mekong Development Joint Stock Commercial Bank 0.73494633 0.62 12,034,978 34 
JCB Nam A Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.73038957 0.60 21,226,767 26 
JCB Lien Viet Post Joint Stock Commercial Bank 0.72165918 0.57 50,898,185 19 
JCB 
Petrolimex Group Commercial Joint Stock Bank – PG 
Bank 
0.71395908 0.55 15,782,398 31 
JVB Vietnam-Russia Joint Venture Bank 0.7033043 0.52 4,777,978 42 
JCB An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank – Abbank 0.70078913 0.5 45,799,775 21 
JCB Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade 0.69768087 0.48 11,088,633 35 
SOCB Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of 0.6924528 0.45 265,636,530 4 
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Vietnam – Vietcombank 
JCB North Asia Bank 0.69040085 0.43 10,931,450 36 
JCB Saigon Commercial Bank – Saigonbank 0.68326246 0.40 49,054,629 20 
JCB Ngan hang Thuong mai Co Phan Bac A – BAC A Bank 0.6793756 0.38 33,738,283 25 
JVB VID Public Bank 0.67535941 0.36 5,752,400 41 
JCB Bao Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.6606589 0.33 13,409,700 32 
JCB 
Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank – SEA 
Bank 
0.64612695 0.31 65,499,467 15 
JCB Saigon-Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.63956134 0.29 62,343,394 16 
JCB DongA Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.63618547 0.26 52,774,120 18 
JCB Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.63378852 0.24 20,742,289 27 
JCB Nam Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank – Navibank 0.62758958 0.21 17,776,365 29 
JCB Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.62156669 0.19 106,774,812 10 
JCB Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.61905061 0.17 114,582,286 8 
JCB Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.59879978 0.14 40,632,783 22 
JCB Viet Capital Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.5611634 0.12 8,225,404 38 
FB Shinhan Bank Vietnam 0.55989798 0.10 20,180,850 28 
JCB 
Viet Nam Thuong tín Joint Stock Commercial Bank – 
Vietbank 
0.5544142 0.07 16,900,200 30 
JCB 
Ho Chi Minh City Development Joint Stock Commercial 
Bank 
0.5520613 0.05 86,226,641 12 
JCB Global Petro Commercial Joint Stock Bank 0.5484213 0.02 7,214,810 40 
JCB Vietnam Development Bank – VDB 0.5051674 0 125,137,925 7 
  
According to the table 7 and the figure 11, it seems that there is not any significant 
efficiency advantage for large banks. This is in line with the findings of Berger and 
Mester (1997) and Pi and Timme (1993). The average efficiency level of the four 
largest banks in Vietnam, Argibank, Viettinbank, BIDV and Vietcombank (in 
decreasing order) are better than 69%, 71%, 64% and 45% of other banks 
respectively. The efficiency level of the smallest bank, Hong Leong Bank, is better 
than 67% of other banks. The most efficient banks in Vietnam are middle-sized 
banks (the twenty-fourth, thirty-ninth and fourteenth positions in the asset ranking), 
which is consistent with the finding of Maudos et al. (2002) who found that medium-
sized banks reach the highest levels of efficiency.  
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The table 7 reflects the true situation of banks in Vietnam in terms of efficiency level. 
According to the table, it should be noted that Techcombank is the fourth most 
efficient bank in Vietnam. In 2014, Techcombank is awarded the best Commercial 
Bank Vietnam 2014, the Best Customer Service Bank Vietnam 2014, the Best 
Internet Bank Vietnam 2014 and the Best Internet Bank Vietnam 2014 from the 
Global Banking & Finance Review (Global Banking & Finance Review, 2014). The 
table also shows that the efficiency level of Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock 
Bank is only better than 24% of other banks. In 2011, Tien Phong Commercial Joint 
Stock Bank was almost forced to be merged with other banks by the SBV due to 
being categorised as “weak bank” under the Restructuring Financial Institutions 
2011-2015 programme as previously stated. The entry of the two new major 
shareholders with holdings of 20% (Do Minh Phu, the chairman of DOJI Group and 
Do Anh Tu, the general director of Diana) saved the bank from being merged 
(Tienphong bank annual report, 2013). 
Figure 11: Relationship between efficiency and size of banks in Vietnam 
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5.2 Profitability’s determinants analysis 
5.2.1 Test results for the validity of SGMM  
The validity of the obtained results from the SGMM is dependent on the statistical 
diagnostics, thus this part is going to interpret the model diagnostics. 
Table 8: Model diagnostics 
Number of observations 129 
Number of instruments 33 
Angrist-Pischke (AP) F test 
H0: endogenous regressor is weekly identified 
F( 2, 116) = 17.43 
Underidentification test 
H0:the studied model is underidentified 
Chi-sq(2) = 21.06 
P-val = 0.0000 
Tests of joint significance of endogenous regressors 
Anderson-Rubin test 




Chi-sq(2) = 24.19 
P-val = 0.0000 
Stock-Wright (2000) S Statistics 
H0: coefficients of the endogenous regressors are jointly equal to 
zero 
Chi-sq(2) = 14.52 
P-val = 0.0007 
Endogeneity test 
H0: endogenous regressors can be treated as exogenous 
Chi-sq(2) = 10.706 
P-val = 0.0011 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences 
H0: There is no first-order serial correlation in residuals 
 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences 
H0: There is no second-order serial correlation in residuals 
z = -2.03 
Pr > z = 0.042 
 
z = 1.34 
Pr > z = 0.180 
Hansen test (Robust, but weakened by many instruments) 
H0: Instruments are valid instruments 
Chi2(21) = 21.19 






Table 9: First-stage regression of TE 
TE Coef. 
Robust 
Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       ROE 
      L1. -0.01267 0.067433 -0.19 0.851 -0.14623 0.120887 
       GDPGR 0.01592 0.019387 0.82 0.413 -0.02248 0.054317 
UNE 0.008385 0.067722 0.12 0.902 -0.12575 0.142517 
LOSRES -2.00188 1.589565 -1.26 0.21 -5.15022 1.146451 
EQAS1 -0.47889 0.329268 -1.45 0.149 -1.13105 0.173268 
COSI1 0.001574 0.000335 4.7 0.000 0.00091 0.002237 
LODEP -0.20199 0.06595 -3.06 0.003 -0.33261 -0.07137 
lnSIZE -0.01607 0.021443 -0.75 0.455 -0.05854 0.026405 
EMP -1.41E-06 2.33E-06 -0.6 0.547 -6.03E-06 3.21E-06 
CR5 0.002717 0.001335 2.03 0.044 7.23E-05 0.005361 
NIIA 6.472921 1.212489 5.34 0.000 4.071434 8.874409 
MS2 0.456048 0.251782 1.81 0.073 -0.04264 0.954735 
_cons 0.719438 0.536127 1.34 0.182 -0.34243 1.781305 
Included instruments: L.ROE GDPGR UNE LOSRES EQAS1 COSI1 LODEP 
lnSIZE EMP CR5 NIIA MS2 
  
According to the table 9, the two selected instruments, NIIA (net interest income over 
asset) and MS2 (market share), are significantly correlated with TE. The number of 
instruments (33) is smaller than the number of observations (129). Further, the F of 
the The Angrist-Pischke (AP) F test is 17.43, which is between the 10% (19.93) and 
15% (11.59) maximal IV size of the Stock-Yogo critical values3. This means the bias 
in selected instruments in the model is only at 10%, hence endogenous regressor 
(i.e. TE) is strongly identified. 
For the underidentification test, p-value is close to zero, which shows the null 
hypothesis that the studied equation is underidentified is rejected. 
For the test of joint significance of endogenous regressors, p-values of the 
Anderson-Rubin test and the Stock-Wright S Statistics are both close zero. This 
means the coefficients of the endogenous regressors in the structural model are not 
jointly equal to zero. 
                                           
3 The table of Stock-Yogo critical values is in the table 12 in the appendix 
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For the endogeneity test, as p-value is close to zero, the null hypothesis that the TE 
can actually be treated as exogenous is rejected. Thus, TE can only be endogenous, 
thus the use of SGMM is appropriate. 
The SGMM assumes that the twice-lagged residuals are not autocorrelated (Efendic 
et al., 2008, p. 12); hence there is a need to test for the first- and second-order 
autocorrelation in the error terms, which is also known as a test for the validity of 
instruments. According to results in the model diagnostics, the null hypothesis that 
there is no first-order serial correlation in residuals is rejected at 5% level of 
confidence, whereas the null hypothesis that there is no second-order serial 
correlation in residuals is not rejected at 10% level of confidence. This is consistent 
with the suggestion of Arrelano and Bond (1991). 
Finally, as the prob > chi2 is 0.447, the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions 
does not reject the null at any conventional level of significance, which indicates that 
the model has valid instrumentation. Further, the p-value of 0.447 is also in line with 
Roodman’s suggestion that the p-value should be at least 0.25 higher than the 
conventional 0.05 or 0.10 levels to deal with the problem of too many instruments. 




5.2.2 Descriptive results 
Table 10: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
ROE 207 0.105967 0.095881 -0.82002 0.431383 
GDPGR 207 6.106222 0.747267 5.247367 7.547248 
UNE 207 2.171981 0.169773 1.9 2.4 
LOSRES 204 0.013245 0.008567 0.001009 0.050586 
EQAS1 207 0.121984 0.107791 0.009428 0.938882 
COSI1 207 13.26841 28.20451 -22.0781 258.0836 
LODEP 207 0.672814 0.403563 0.185195 5.057954 
lnSIZE 207 17.61217 1.372917 14.38115 20.23705 
EMP 149 5574.154 6217.886 324 41289 
CR5 207 58.7272 12.57302 46.54 91.99 
TE 207 0.70172 0.141377 0.338253 0.94717 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The table 10 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
regression of banks’ profitability. On average, ROE of the Vietnamese banking 
system is about 10.5% in the last decade. The standard deviation of this figure is 
about 9% indicating a big difference in ROEs of banks in Vietnam. Particularly, the 
maximum ROE of 0.43.1 belongs to Agribank in 2006 when there was a boom in the 
Vietnamese securities market with an unbelievable rise in VNIndex of 146%. The 
minimum ROE of -0.82 belongs to Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock Bank in 2011 
which was almost forced to be merged due to being categorised as “weak bank” 
under the Restructuring Financial Institutions 2011-2015 programme. All of the bank-
specific factors have large standard deviation showing wide disperse between the 
highest value and lowest value of these variables. This means in Vietnam the 
performance and operation among banks are rather different to each other in the last 
10 years. The significant difference between the highest and lowest CR5 of 91.99% 
and 46.54% in 2004 and 2011 shows the success of JCBs in grabbing market share 
of SOCBs during the period of 2004-2013. 
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5.2.3 Discussion of banks’ profitability result  
The results of the SGMM are presented in the following table: 




z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
       
ROE 0.249931 0.237759 1.05 0.293 -0.21607 0.715931 
L1.       
 
      
GDPGR -0.00453 0.008059 -0.56 0.574 -0.02033 0.011266 
UNE 0.084885 0.036217 2.34 0.019 0.013901 0.15587 
LOSRES -0.75426 1.786937 -0.42 0.673 -4.25659 2.748075 
EQAS1 -0.32588 0.551987 -0.59 0.555 -1.40776 0.755994 
COSI1 -0.00282 0.001275 -2.21 0.027 -0.00531 -0.00032 
LODEP -0.13956 0.065931 -2.12 0.034 -0.26878 -0.01033 
lnSIZE 0.007914 0.018316 0.43 0.666 -0.02798 0.043812 
EMP 1.50E-06 2.38E-06 0.63 0.527 -3.16E-06 6.17E-06 
CR5 -0.00026 0.001033 -0.25 0.799 -0.00229 0.001762 
TE 0.098853 0.04293 2.3 0.021 0.014712 0.182995 
_cons -0.10809 0.465407 -0.23 0.816 -1.02027 0.804088 
Excluded instruments: MS2 NIIA 
Overall, the unemployment rate (UNE) and technical efficiency (TE) are found to 
have positive impacts on ROE; while cost to income ratio (COSI1) and loan to 
deposit ratio (LODEP) are negatively correlated with ROE. GDP growth (GDPGR), 
impaired loan reserve to gross loan ratio (LOSRES), equity to total asset ratio 
(EQAS1), size (lnSIZE), number of employees (EMP) and concentration ratio (CR5) 
are not important in determining the profitability of banks in Vietnam in the studied 
period. Detailed discussion is as follows. 
Bank-specific determinants 
Operational management 
This paper found a positive relationship between TE and ROE, which means that 
when a bank increases TE, there will be a rise in ROE. This result is in line with 
Berger (1995) and as CR5 is insignificant, there is evidence for the existence of the 
efficiency structure hypothesis in the Vietnamese banking sector. As the efficiency 
analysis above shows that a typical bank in Vietnam wastes about 26.2% of its costs 
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relative to the best-practice banks, the finding of positive relationship between TE 
and ROE will encourage banks to improve their usage of inputs in producing outputs. 
The result with respect to the impact of lnSIZE on profitability supports the findings of 
Micco et al. (2007) who found no correlation between the bank size and profitability. 
In other words, banks in Vietnam do not benefit from exploiting economy of scale by 
increasing size. In fact, given a wide national branch networks and support from the 
government, large banks in Vietnam especially SOCBs are not performing better 
than (if not worse than) FBs and medium JCBs in retail banking with limited branch 
networks (Quach, 2011). Thus, the result that bank size does not affect bank 
profitability in Vietnam is justifiable.  
Unsurprisingly, COSI1 is negatively correlated with ROE, which means higher costs 
to net income will lead to lower profit. The poor expense management is considered 
the main contributor to poor profitability performance. This is consistent with the 
existing literature and many studies (Kosmidou, 2008, Liu and Wilson, 2009, and 
Goddard et al., 2001). With respect to expenses management in Vietnam, banks 
should focus on interest expense as it accounts for 78% of total expenses in the last 
decade (see figure 12). According to the figure 13, the interest expense 
management of the Vietnamese banking system was inefficient in 2008, 2011 and 
2012, when net income growth was lower than interest expense growth. The 
situation was reversed in 2007, 2009 and 2013 showing that the interest expense 
management was better in these years. 
Figure 12: Distribution of expenses for the Vietnamese banking system in the period 
2004-2013 
 









Figure 13: net income growth vs interest expense growth 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
The number of employees (EMP) is found to have no effects on banks’ profitability in 
Vietnam. This is in line with the findings of Aburime (2008) who found that staff 
number does not significantly determine the profitability of banks in Nigeria from 
2000 to 2004. The period of 2004-2013 witnessed a significant change in banking 
technology in Vietnam consisting of the use of banking software to computerize 
transactions, the development of the ATM networks, the issuing of debit and credit 
cards, internet banking services (Vu and Turnell, 2010). Thus, in terms of human 
resources, quantity is no longer important and banks focus more on quality instead. 
In fact, some large banks in Vietnam reduced the number of employees recently. For 
example, in 2013, the number of employees in Maritime bank and ACB reduced by 
1,343 and 1,115 respectively. This was because both banks want to reduce the 
scope of activities and concentrate on their own focuses to improve the quality of 
their products and services (Maritime bank annual report, 2013 and ACB annual 
report 2013). 
Risk management 
Empirical studies show a positive relationship between equity to asset ratio (EQAS1) 
and bank profitability (ROE). For instance, Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and 
García-Herrero et al. (2009) explained banks with higher capital adequacy have less 
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argues that banks with high capital adequacy can access to cheap resources due to 
the lower risk of going bankrupt. Nevertheless, this relationship does not apply for 
the Vietnamese banking system in which EQAS1 is insignificant. This means in 
Vietnam the level of equity does not influence costs of funding. This can be 
explained by the structural framework of the Vietnamese banking system where 
many large banks rely on government funding through recurrent recapitalizations as 
stated in the country analysis section. Further, the figure 14 also shows that equity is 
not effective in determining bank profitability in Vietnam when equity increased 
significantly while net income just went up very slightly. The dramatic increase in 
equity of the Vietnamese banking system is due to the adoption of Basel I on capital 
adequacy in late 2005. Before 2005, the capital adequacy ratio of SOCBs in Vietnam 
just varied from about 3.5% to 5.5%, which was low compared to the requirement of 
at least 8% of Basel I (see table 15 in the appendix) 
Figure 14: Equity vs Net income 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
Loan to deposit ratio (LODEP) is found to have a negative impact on ROE of banks 
in Vietnam. This is inconsistent with existing literature which says that higher LODEP 














There are two reasons for this result. First, soft budget constraints created by 
recurrent recapitalizations in the last decade in Vietnam “encouraged” banks 
especially SOCBs to continue to make inefficient loans (Le, 2006). The situation 
became worse as soft budget constraints of banks will lead to soft budget constraints 
of borrowers (Berglof and Roland, 1997) and this resulted in the situation that banks 
only finance worst firms. Second, banks in Vietnam place greater value on political 
connections and partnership relationship than performance in giving loan, thus firms 
with greater access to bank loans are no more profitable than firms without them 
(Malesky and Taussig, 2009). Bui (2013) also revealed that some JCBs spent up to 
60%-70% of their total loans to finance their partners and shareholders. As banks in 
Vietnam rely on government’s support and connections to make loans regardless the 
creditability of borrowers, LODEP is negatively correlated with ROE. 
Impair loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio (LOSRES) is found not to be important 
in determining banks’ profitability in Vietnam in the period 2004-2013. This result is 
consistent with Dinh (2013) who found loan loss provision to total asset ratio is 
irrelevant with profit before tax when studying 51 commercial banks operating in 
Vietnam from 2000 to 2012. 
Industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants 
The result shows that the coefficient between the concentration ratio (CR5) and 
profitability is insignificant, which means there is no evidence for the existence of the 
SCP hypothesis in the Vietnamese banking system. Staikouras and Wood (2003) 
also reported the same result when they examined the performance of a sample of 
banks operating in thirteen EU banking markets. In other words, banks in Vietnam do 
not earn abnormal profit through getting concentrated. The figure 15 also illustrates 
that there is no specific relationship between CR5 and ROE for the Vietnamese 
banking system. The decrease in ROE is due to the negative effects of economic 
downturn; and the decrease in concentration ratio is due to tough competition 
between SOCBs and other non-state commercial banks. Specifically, there was a 
substantial reduction in the total loans of the sector made by SOCBs from 74.2% in 
2005 to 48.3% in 2010. Their deposit market share also reduced from 74.2% to 





Figure 15: CR5 vs ROE 
 
Source: Author’s calculation 
GDP growth (GDPGR) is found to be insignificant, which means banks in Vietnam do 
not benefit from GDP growth. The result is consistent with Ongore and Kusa (2013) 
and Flamini et al., (2009). Theoretically, GDP growth can have positive impacts on 
banks’ profitability as growth of personal consumption, investment, net exports of 
goods and services implies the increased demand for bank loans and thus bank 
profit. Nevertheless, the underdeveloped consumer banking in Vietnam diminishes 
the influence of GDP growth on banks’ profitability. Even though the last decade 
witnessed a significant advance in banking technology such as the development of 
ATM system or the issuing of debit and credit cards, the number of people actually 
using them is limited. In 2009, Moody (2009) reported that only 17% of the 
population of Vietnam have bank accounts. In 2012, Williams (2012) reported that 
just 32% maintain a transactional account, 31% use debit cards, and only 12% use 
banks for deposit accounts. He also revealed that only 42% are aware of credit card 
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them. Consequently, although Vietnam belongs to the minority group reporting a rise 
in GDP growth during the crisis period of 2009-2013, this does not affect the 
profitability of the banking system as expected. 
Interestingly, the unemployment rate (UNE) has positive impacts on banks’ 
profitability. Although this contrasts with existing literature arguing that banks can 
charge higher prices in the loan markets to earn higher returns in a good economic 
environment, this reflects the true picture of the Vietnamese banking system recent 
years. As already stated in the banking system analysis, Vietnamese banks are 
principally corporate lenders and two thirds of all enterprises primarily rely on bank 
loans for operations. Specifically, Vietnam Association of Consumer Goods 
Development (VACOD, 2012) reported that 90% of all seafood exporters 100% rely 
on bank loans or 70-90% of the total capitals of real estate enterprises are being 
financed by banks. It should be noted that banks in Vietnam finance many SOEs 
through buying government bonds (Bui, 2014). In order words, they lend the 
government and earn profits from government’s budget. As there is no credit risk 
when banks make loans to the government, banks in Vietnam continue to finance 
SOEs to earn profits. Consequently, even when 100,000 enterprises out of 600,000 
in total went bankrupt between 2011 and 2012, leading to the high unemployment 





5.3 Policy discussion 
This part suggests policies for bank managers, supervisors and regulators. The 
result of this paper suggest that bank manager should focus on the three important 
following elements as they have impacts on banks’ profitability. First, a significant 
relationship between COSI1and ROE suggest that bank managers should pay 
attention to expense management, especially interest expense management as it 
accounts for 78% of total expenses. In 2013, banks are good at managing interest 
expense when the interest expense growth reduced by 0.46% for the whole system 
and was lower than net income growth. Bank managers should continue to improve 
interest expense management. Second, as LODEP is found to be negatively 
correlated with ROE, bank managers need to reconsider loan approval process. 
Banks should place greater value on performance of borrowers rather than on 
political connections and partnership relationship in giving loans, thus firms with 
greater access to bank loans need to be more profitable than firms without them. 
This is also a solution to reduce bad debts together with the establishment of VAMC 
of government to buy back bad debts in 2013. Third, as technical efficiency which 
reflects the effectiveness of banks in Vietnam to produce outputs given a set of 
inputs is found to be endogenous to ROE, it is affected by bank-specific factors 
consisting of poor risk management, inefficient screening and monitoring, or making 
loan decisions without anticipating changes in the business cycle rather than 
negative macroeconomic shocks or bad luck. Thus, the improvement of efficiency is 
under the control of bank managers. Further, a positive relationship between 
technical efficiency and ROE together with the irrelevance of concentration ratio 
(CR5) suggests the existence of efficiency structure hypothesis in the Vietnamese 
banking system. Consequently, so as to increase profitability, bank managers need 
to increase banks’ efficiency. The average efficiency of 0.738 of the Vietnamese 
banking system in the last decade means that a typical bank wastes around 26.2% 
of its costs relative to the best-practice banks. In other words, on average, a bank 
needs to reduce 26.2% of its inputs in order to be as efficient as the best practice 
bank.  
In respect to the banking industry, as concentration ratio (CR5) is not important in 
determining ROE in the Vietnamese banking system, there is no evidence for the 
 
 75 
existence of the structure conduct performance hypothesis which argues that a 
higher bank concentration allows a higher degree of cooperation between banks and 
these banks might set higher prices and consequently gain substantial profits. This 
means banks’ performance is not considered as a result of the exogenous structure 
of the market in Vietnam. In fact, the concentration ratio also reduced dramatically 
from 91.99% to 60.44% in the last decade due to tough competition from the entry of 
JCBs and FBs. For supervisors and regulators, this result suggests that banks in 
Vietnam do not exert a monopoly power entailing the exploitation of customers. 
In terms of macroeconomic factors, the underdeveloped consumer banking in 
Vietnam diminishes the influence of GDP growth on banks’ profitability. Even though 
the last decade witnessed a significant advance in banking technology such as the 
development of ATM system or the issuing of debit and credit cards, the number of 
people actually using them is limited. Banks should pay more attention to consumer 
banking to take more advantages from the growth in GDP. In addition, the result also 
shows that banks can still earn profit through investing in government bonds even 
when the economic condition is bad reflecting through an increase in unemployment 
rate. The paper suggests that the government should not continue to finance 
inefficient SOEs through banks’ budget as this causes irrational allocation of the 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS 
This paper specified an empirical framework to estimate the technical efficiency level 
of Vietnamese banks and then investigate its effect and other bank-specific, industry-
specific and macroeconomic determinants on the profitability of the banking system 
in Vietnam during the period 2004-2013. An unbalanced panel data of 43 banks with 
207 observations is utilized. 
With respect to technical efficiency, on average, the efficiency level is around 73.8%. 
Furthermore, the period also witnessed a decreasing trend with the gap of efficiency 
between banks widening throughout the period. This is consistent with many studies 
about the efficiency level of the Vietnamese banking system (see Vu and Turnell, 
2010; Ngo, 2012 and Nguyen and DeBorger, 2008). There are three major drops in 
the efficiency level of the Vietnamese banking system in 2007, 2009 and 2013. The 
first one is likely due to the “bubble and trouble” of the Vietnamese security market 
started in 2006 when Vietnam joined WTO. The 2009 drop can be primarily 
attributed to the instability of the Vietnam’s economy caused by the global financial 
crisis. Multiple scandals, specifically illegal cross-bank deposits and investment of 
the banking tycoon Nguyen Duc Kien, the bad debt concealment of commercial 
banks and the inefficient “loan growth restriction” programme, led to a reduction of 
efficiency in 2012 and 2013. In addition, larger banks seem not to outperform smaller 
banks in technical efficiency which is consistent with results of Berger and Mester 
(1997). The most efficient banks in Vietnam are middle-sized banks. 
In terms of determinants of bank profitability, bank-specific (including technical 
efficiency), industry-specific and macroeconomic factors are considered. For bank-
specific variables, the cost-to-income (COSI1) has a negative and significant impact 
on profitability, which shows that cost decisions of bank management are 
instrumental in influencing bank performance. Additionally, the loan-to-deposit 
(LODEP) ratios are also negatively related to the profitability of Vietnamese banks, 
which questions the quality of loans of the system when banks place greater value 
on connections than performance in giving loans. Technical efficiency (TE) is found 
to be positively correlated with Vietnamese bank profitability, which shows the 
existence of efficient structure hypothesis in which increased efficiency can lead to 
higher profit. Further, as TE is found to be endogenous to ROE, which means TE is 
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influenced by internal factors inside banks, there is opportunity for bank managers to 
improve bank efficiency. The estimated effect of size (LnSIZE) does not provide 
evidence of economies of scale in the system. Likewise, the improvement in banking 
technology during the last decade diminishes the effects of the number of employees 
(EMP) on bank performance, and banks instead focus more on quality of employees. 
The insignificance of the equity-to-asset ratio (EQAS1) means that in Vietnam the 
level of equity does not influence costs of funding and thus has no impacts on 
profitability. Besides, the impair loan loss reserves to gross loan ratio (LOSRES) also 
has no impacts on bank performance, which is in line with Dinh’s result (2013). 
For macroeconomic factors, the positive relationship between unemployment rate 
and bank performance reveals the irrational use of government bonds of the 
government to finance inefficient SOEs through bank’s budget. The finding of 
Malesky and Taussig (2009) supports this result. Moreover, GDP growth is 
insignificant in explaining bank profitability. One of the main reasons for this result is 
that the underdeveloped consumer banking in Vietnam diminishes the influence of 
GDP growth on banks’ profitability as banks cannot take advantage of the personal 
consumption growth when the number of people actually using consumer banking is 
limited. For industry variables, it is noteworthy that the concentration ratio (CR5) is 
not important in explaining bank profitability. This shows that banks in Vietnam do 
not exert a monopoly power which entails the exploitation of customers. 
Overall, these empirical results provide evidence that the profitability of Vietnamese 
banks is shaped by bank-specific factors (including TE) and macroeconomic control 
variables. Industry structure does not seem to significantly affect profitability. Further, 
TE is found to be endogenous to ROE, which means it is affected by bank-level 
management rather than bad luck. The approach followed in this research can have 
considerable potential as a tool for exploring bank efficiency level and profitability 
determinants with the aim of suggesting optimal policies to bank management. 
Although efforts have been made to ensure that the estimated results are reliable 
such as removing investment banks or using GDP deflator to combat inflation before 
estimation, missing data prevent the desire to produce a plausible estimation. As 
Vietnam has just started to be integrated into the world economy since 2006, the 
availability of published accounts is limited. After handling for missing data, the 
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sample size reduces from 610 to 207 observations. Further, this paper only 
examines technical efficiency under SFA method and the impact of selected 
determinants on ROE. Hence, this research can be extended by investigating cost 
efficiency and profit efficiency, using non-parametric approaches such as DEA and 
selecting other determinants and other profitability measures such as return on 
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Table 12: Stock-Yogo critical values for the weak instrument test (Significance level is 5%) 




0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25  0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 
1 16.38 8.96 6.66 5.53  
    2 19.93 11.59 8.75 7.25  7.03 4.58 3.95 3.63 
3 22.3 12.83 9.54 7.8  13.43 8.18 6.4 5.45 
4 24.58 13.96 10.26 8.31  16.87 9.93 7.54 6.28 
5 26.87 15.09 10.98 8.84  19.45 11.22 8.38 6.89 
6 29.18 16.23 11.72 9.38  21.68 12.33 9.1 7.42 
7 31.5 17.38 12.48 9.93  23.72 13.34 9.77 7.91 
8 33.84 18.54 13.24 10.5  25.64 14.31 10.41 8.39 
9 36.19 19.71 14.01 11.07  27.51 15.24 11.03 8.85 
10 38.54 20.88 14.78 11.65  29.32 16.16 11.65 9.31 
11 40.9 22.06 15.56 12.23  31.11 17.06 12.25 9.77 
12 43.27 23.24 16.35 12.82  32.88 17.95 12.86 10.22 
13 45.64 24.42 17.14 13.41  34.62 18.84 13.45 10.68 
14 48.01 25.61 17.93 14  36.36 19.72 14.05 11.13 
15 50.39 26.8 18.72 14.6  38.08 20.6 14.65 11.58 
16 52.77 27.99 19.51 15.19  39.8 21.48 15.24 12.03 
17 55.15 29.19 20.31 15.79  41.51 22.35 15.83 12.49 
18 57.53 30.38 21.1 16.39  43.22 23.22 16.42 12.94 
19 59.92 31.58 21.9 16.99  44.92 24.09 17.02 13.39 
20 62.3 32.77 22.7 17.6  46.62 24.96 17.61 13.84 
21 64.69 33.97 23.5 18.2  48.31 25.82 18.2 14.29 
22 67.07 35.17 24.3 18.8  50.01 26.69 18.79 14.74 
23 69.46 36.37 25.1 19.41  51.7 27.56 19.38 15.19 
24 71.85 37.57 25.9 20.01  53.39 28.42 19.97 15.64 
25 74.24 38.77 26.71 20.61  55.07 29.29 20.56 16.1 
26 76.62 39.97 27.51 21.22  56.76 30.15 21.15 16.55 
27 79.01 41.17 28.31 21.83  58.45 31.02 21.74 17 
28 81.4 42.37 29.12 22.43  60.13 31.88 22.33 17.45 
29 83.79 43.57 29.92 23.04  61.82 32.74 22.92 17.9 
30 86.17 44.78 30.72 23.65  63.51 33.61 23.51 18.35 
 







Table 13: list of banks in the studied sample 
Bank name Type    
Bank for Investment and Development of Vietnam – BIDV SOCB  Saigon - Hanoi Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
Housing Bank of Mekong Delta – MHB SOCB  Saigon Bank for Industry and Trade JCB 
Joint Stock Commercial Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam – Vietcombank SOCB  Saigon Commercial Bank – Saigonbank JCB 
Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development – Agribank SOCB  Saigon ThuongTin Commercial Joint-Stock Bank – Sacombank JCB 
Vietnam Joint-Stock Commercial Bank for Industry and Trade – Viettinbank SOCB  Southeast Asia Commercial Joint Stock Bank-SEA Bank JCB 
VID Public Bank JVB  Southern Bank-Phuong Nam Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
Vietnam-Russia Joint Venture Bank JVB  Southern Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
An Binh Commercial Joint Stock Bank – ABBANK JCB  Tien Phong Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
Asia Commercial Joint-stock Bank – ACB  JCB  Viet Capital Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
Bao Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB  Viet Nam Thuong tín Joint Stock Commercial Bank – VietBANK JCB 
DongA Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB  Vietnam Asia Commercial Joint-Stock Bank JCB 
Global Petro Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB  Vietnam Development Bank - VDB JCB 
Ho Chi Minh City Development Joint Stock Commercial Bank JCB  Vietnam Export Import Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB 
Lien Viet Post Joint Stock Commercial Bank JCB  VietNam International Commercial Joint Stock Bank – VIB  JCB 
Mekong Development Joint Stock Commercial Bank JCB  Vietnam Maritime Commercial Stock Bank JCB 
Military Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB  Vietnam Prosperity Joint Stock Commercial Bank – VP Bank JCB 
Nam A Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB  
Vietnam Technological and Commercial Joint-Stock Bank – 
Techcombank 
JCB 
Nam Viet Commercial Joint Stock Bank – Navibank JCB  ANZ Bank (Vietnam) Limited FB 
Ngan hang Thuong mai Co Phan Bac A – BAC A Bank JCB  Hong Leong Bank Vietnam Limited FB 
North Asia Bank JCB  Shinhan Bank Vietnam FB 
Ocean Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB    
Orient Commercial Joint Stock Bank JCB    





Table 14: Structure of Vietnam’s banking system 1990-2013 
 1990 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
SOCBs 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
JCBs 0 4 41 48 51 48 39 37 36 37 34 34 39 40 37 35 38 38 
JVBs 0 1 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 
FBs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 5 5 5 8 
Total 4 9 48 56 60 57 48 46 45 47 44 44 54 55 52 49 52 55 
Source: Lieu and Vo (2012), Le (2006) and SBV annual report 2011, 2012, 2013 
 
Table 15: Capital adequacy ratio of SOCBs in Vietnam before 2005 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Agribank 5.63% 5.54% 4.70% 3.09% 4.75% 4.30% 5.43% 
BIDV 2.35% 2.58% 2.60% 1.74% 3.00% 3.50% 4.76% 
Viettinbank 2.08% 2.42% 2.33% 1.47% 3.38% 3.40% 3.64% 





Figure 16: Market share of banks in Vietnam 
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